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We reconstruct quantum theory starting from the premise that, as Asher Peres remarked, “Un-
performed experiments have no results.” The tools of quantum information theory, and in particular
the symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurements, provide a concise expression of how
exactly Peres’s dictum holds true. That expression is a constraint on how the probability distri-
butions for outcomes of different, hypothetical and mutually exclusive experiments ought to mesh
together, a type of constraint not foreseen in classical thinking. Taking this as our foundational prin-
ciple, we show how to reconstruct the formalism of quantum theory in finite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces. Along the way, we derive a condition for the existence of a d-dimensional SIC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The arena for standard probability theory is the proba-
bility simplex—that is, for a trial of n possible outcomes,
the continuous set ∆n of all n-vectors p with nonnega-
tive entries p(i) satisfying
∑
i p(i) = 1. But what is the
arena for quantum theory? The answer to this question
depends upon how one views quantum theory. If, for
instance, one views it as a noncommutative generaliza-
tion of probability theory, then the arena could be the
convex sets of density operators and positive-operator-
valued measures over a complex Hilbert space. In con-
trast, Refs. [1–3] have argued that quantum theory is not
so much a generalization of probability theory as an addi-
tion to it. This means that standard probability theory is
never invalidated, but that further rules must be added
to it when the subject matter concerns measurements
on quantum systems. One implication of this is that be-
hind every application of quantum theory is a more basic
simplex, which through a not-yet-completely-understood
consistency requirement, gets trimmed or cropped to a
convex subset isomorphic to the usual space of quantum
states [4].1 In the specific context formalized below, we
call an arena of this sort—a suitably cropped simplex as
the starting point for a full-fledged derivation of quantum
theory—a qplex. In a slogan: If the simplex is the start-
ing point for probability theory, the qplex is the starting
point for the quantum.
The introduction of a more basic simplex surrounding
the qplex, however, should not be construed as a capitu-
lation to the idea of a hidden-variable theory. Rather it is
an attempt to bring to the front of the formalism a foun-
dational idea nicely captured by Asher Peres’s famous
quip “unperformed experiments have no outcomes” [6].
Here the simplex stands for the outcomes of an experi-
1 See also [5, p. 487] for the historical roots of this idea.
ment that will never be done, but could have been done.
How is probability theory all by itself to connect the one
experiment to the other? It has no tools for it. But quan-
tum theory does, through the Born rule, when suitably
rewritten in the language of the qplex. From this point
of view, the meaning of the Born rule for probabilities in
any actual experiment is that “behind” the experiment is
a different, hypothetical experiment whose probabilities
must be taken into account in the calculation.
To be concrete, let us rewrite quantum theory in a
language that would make this apparent were the right
mathematical tool available. Consider the setting of a
finite d-level quantum system, and suppose that one of
the elusive symmetric informationally complete quantum
measurements [7, 8] exists for it. We shall call such an
object a “SIC” for short. A SIC is a set of d2 rank-one
projection operators Πi = |ψi〉〈ψi| such that
tr(ΠkΠl) =
dδkl + 1
d+ 1
. (1)
For such a set of operators, one can prove that if they ex-
ist at all, they must be linearly independent, and rescal-
ing each to 1dΠi, they collectively give an informationally
complete positive-operator-valued measure (POVM), i.e.,∑
i
1
dΠi = I. Thus, for any quantum state ρ, a SIC can
be used to specify a measurement for which the proba-
bilities of outcomes p(i) specify ρ itself. That is, if
p(i) =
1
d
tr(ρΠi) , (2)
then
ρ =
d2∑
i=1
[
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
]
Πi (3)
= (d+ 1)
d2∑
i=1
p(i)Πi − I. (4)
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2Is it always possible to write a quantum state like this?2
Unfortunately, to date, analytic proofs of SIC existence
have only been found in dimensions 2–21, 24, 28, 30,
31, 35, 37, 39, 43 and 48 [10, 11]. However, very high-
precision numerical approximations (many to 8,000 and
16,000 digits) have been discovered for all dimensions 2
to 147 without exception, plus some dimensions sporad-
ically beyond that—168, 172, 195, 199, 228, 259, 323, at
last count [12–14]. In general, the mood of the commu-
nity is that a SIC should exist in every finite dimension
d, but we call the SICs “elusive” because in more than
18 years of effort no one has ever proven it. See Ref. [16]
for an extensive bibliography on the subject. For the
purpose of the present discussion, let us suppose that at
least one SIC can be found in any finite dimension d.
One can now see how to express quantum-state space
as a proper subset Q of a probability simplex ∆d2 over
d2 outcomes. That it cannot be the full simplex comes
about from the following consideration: For any p ∈ ∆d2 ,
Eq. (3) gives a Hermitian operator ρ with trace 1, but the
operator may not be positive-semidefinite as is required
of a density operator. Instead, the density operators
correspond to a convex subset specified by its extreme
points, the pure states ρ2 = ρ. Thanks to an observa-
tion by Jones, Flammia and Linden [17, 18], we can also
characterize pure states as those Hermitian matrices sat-
isfying
tr ρ2 = tr ρ3 = 1. (5)
This expression of purity yields two conditions on the
probability distributions p [1, 2, 19]. First,
d2∑
i=1
p(i)2 =
2
d(d+ 1)
, (6)
and second, ∑
ijk
cijk p(i)p(j)p(k) =
d+ 7
(d+ 1)3
, (7)
where we have defined the real-valued, completely sym-
metric three-index tensor
cijk = Re tr(ΠiΠjΠk). (8)
The full state space Q is the convex hull of probability
distributions satisfying Eqs. (6) and (7).
So the claim can be made true, but what a strange-
looking set the quantum states become when written in
these terms! What could account for it except already
knowing the full-blown quantum theory as usually for-
mulated?
2 To our knowledge the first person to write down this expression
was the Cornell University undergraduate Gabriel G. Plunk in an
attachment to a 18 June 2002 email to one of us (CAF), though
it went undiscovered for many years. See Ref. [9, pp. 472–474].
Nevertheless, every familiar operation in the textbook
quantum formalism has its translation into the language
of this underlying probability simplex, properly restricted
to the subset Q. For example, given a quantum state ρ,
one uses the Born rule to calculate the probabilities an
experiment will yield its various outcomes with. Using
the SIC representation, the description of the measuring
apparatus becomes an ordinary set of conditional proba-
bilities, r(j|i). For instance, for a POVM defined by the
set of effects
{E1, . . . , En},
∑
j
Ej = I, (9)
the Born rule tells us the probabilities q(j) for its out-
comes are
q(j) = tr(ρEj), (10)
but this can be reexpressed as
q(j) =
∑
i
[
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
]
r(j|i), (11)
where
r(j|i) = tr(EjΠi) (12)
meets the criteria for a conditional probability distribu-
tion.
In Ref. [1], the simple form in Eq. (11) was consid-
ered so evocative of the usual law of total probability
from standard probability theory, and seemingly so basic
to Peres’s “unperformed experiments have no outcomes”
considerations, that it was dubbed the urgleichung—or
German for “primal equation.”
Similarly, if we have a quantum state ρ encoding our
expectations for the SIC measurement on some system
at time t = 0, we can evolve that state forward to deduce
what we should expect at a later time, t = τ . In text-
book language, we relate these two quantum states by
a quantum channel—in the simplest case, by a unitary
operation:
ρ′ = UρU†. (13)
Let the SIC representation of ρ be p(i), and let the SIC
representation of ρ′ be p′(j). We translate the unitary U
into SIC language by calculating
u(j|i) = 1
d
tr
(
UΠiU
†Πj
)
. (14)
The object u is a d2 × d2 doubly stochastic matrix [22].
But now, something fascinating happens. The two quan-
tum states p(i) and p′(j) are related according to
p′(j) =
∑
i
[
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
]
u(j|i), (15)
an expression identical in form to Eq. (11).
3Formulas (11) and (15) may be compared with what
would have been given by the standard law of total prob-
ability
q(j) =
∑
i
p(i)r(j|i), (16)
and the standard rule for stochastic evolution,
p′(j) =
∑
i
p(i)u(j|i), (17)
were they applicable. This emphasizes again that the
quantum laws are different but, in the setting of a SIC-
induced simplex, intriguingly similar to their classical
counterparts.
This leads one to wonder whether, or to what extent,
these very special forms Eqs. (11) and (15) might imply
the very arena Q in which they are valid. This is the
program laid out in Refs. [1–3] and a key motivation for
the geometric studies of Refs. [19–21]. Here we will carry
the program much further than previously.
Another familiar operation in the standard language
of quantum theory is the Hilbert–Schmidt inner product
between two quantum states, tr(ρσ). Using the SIC rep-
resentations of ρ and σ as probability vectors p and s, it
is straightforward to show that
tr(ρσ) = d(d+ 1)〈p, s〉 − 1. (18)
Because the inner product of any two quantum states ρ
and σ is bounded between 0 and 1, we know that
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ 〈p, s〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (19)
We designate these the fundamental inequalities. The
upper bound is simply the quadratic constraint we saw
already in Eq. (6), but the lower bound imposes new and
surprisingly intricate conditions on the vectors that can
be admissible states.
We will say that two vectors p and s in the probability
simplex ∆d2 are consistent if their inner product obeys
both inequalities in Eq. (19). If we have a subset of the
probability simplex in which every pair of vectors obeys
those bounds, we call it a germ: It is an entity from which
a larger structure can grow. If including one additional
vector in a germ could make that set inconsistent, then
that germ is said to be a maximal. We will see that a
maximal germ is one way to define a qplex.
Any quantum state space in SIC representation is a
qplex. However, the converse is not true: There exist
qplexes that are not equivalent to quantum state space.
That said, any qplex is already a mathematically rich
structure. A primary goal of this paper is to use that
richness and identify an extra condition which can be im-
posed upon a qplex, such that satisfying that constraint
will make the qplex into a quantum state space.
In Section II we see how quantum physics furnishes a
new way that probability assignments can mesh together,
a way not foreseen in classical thinking. This will lead us
from very general considerations to the specific definition
of a qplex. In Section III we apply a tool from the theory
of polytopes [28, 29] to derive a number of basic results
about the geometry of an arbitrary qplex. Among other
applications, we find a simple, intuitively appealing proof
that a polytope embedded in quantum state space cannot
contain the in-sphere of quantum state space.
Sections IV and V are the core of the paper. In al-
most every geometrical problem, a study of the symme-
tries of the object or objects of interest plays an essential
role. However, it turns out that qplexes have the unusual
property that the symmetry group, instead of having to
be imposed from the outside, is contained internally to
the structure. In this they might be compared with ellip-
tic curves [30]. In spite of the extreme simplicity of the
defining equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b, (20)
elliptic curves have managed to remain at the cutting
edge of mathematics for two millennia, from the work
of Diophantus down to the present day. They play an
important role in, for example, the recent proof of Fer-
mat’s last theorem [31]. One of the reasons for their high
degree of mathematical importance is the fact that they
carry within themselves a concealed group. Qplexes have
a similar property. In Sections IV and V we describe this
property, and examine its implications.
In Section IV we present our main application. We
apply the results established in the previous section to
the SIC existence problem and show that SIC existence
in dimension d is equivalent to the existence of a certain
kind of subgroup of the real orthogonal group in dimen-
sion d2 − 1. We presented this result in a previous pub-
lication [21], where we derived it by more conventional
means. In this paper, we describe the way we originally
proved it, using the qplex formulation. This is because
we believe the method of proof is at least as interesting
as the result itself.
In Section VI we turn to the problem of identifying
the “missing assumption” which will serve to pick out
quantum state space uniquely from the set of all qplexes.
Of course, as is usual in such cases, there is more than
one possibility. We identify one such assumption: the
requirement that the symmetry group contain a subgroup
isomorphic to the projective unitary group. This is a
useful result because it means that we have a complete
characterization of quantum state space in probabilistic
terms. It also has an important corollary: That SIC
existence in dimension d is equivalent to the existence of
a certain kind of subgroup of the real orthogonal group
in dimension d2 − 1.
Finally, we wrap up in Section VII with list of sev-
eral possible directions for future investigations. If this
research program is on the right track, it is imperative
that a more basic path from qplex to quantum state space
be found. There is plenty of work to do here.
4II. THE BASIC SCHEME
The urgleichung (11) and the inequalities (19) are not
independent. In this section, we will start with a gener-
alized form of the urgleichung and, making a few addi-
tional assumptions, derive the fundamental inequalities.
This is, strictly speaking, not necessary for the mathe-
matical developments in the later sections of the paper.
One can assume the fundamental inequalities as a start-
ing point and then proceed from that premise. In fact,
we will later see that using that approach, one can de-
rive as consequences the assumptions we will invoke here.
Speaking in general terms, we can think of this section
as proving the “if” direction, and the following section
as proving “only if.” One benefit of deriving the funda-
mental inequalities in this manner is to help compare and
contrast our reconstruction of quantum theory with other
approaches [32–38]. These other reconstructions are op-
erational in character: They take, as fundamental con-
ceptual ingredients, laboratory procedures like “prepa-
rations” and “tests.” Our language in this section will
have a similar tone. However, we will keep Peres’ dictum
that “unperformed experiments have no results” at the
forefront of our considerations.
Our first step is to understand how the urgleichung is
an example of this principle. To do so, we consider the
following scenario [3, 32].
Fix a dimension d ≥ 2, and consider a system to which
we will ascribe a quantum state in d-dimensional Hilbert
space Hd. We will investigate this system by means of
two measuring devices, which we model in the standard
way by POVMs. One measuring device is a SIC measure-
ment, defined by a set of d2 rank-1 projection operators
{Πi}. The effects which comprise this POVM are the
operators rescaled by the dimension:
Ei =
1
d
Πi. (21)
We will refer to this as the “Bureau of Standards” mea-
surement. It is helpful to imagine this measuring de-
vice as being located in some comparatively inaccessible
place: perhaps inside a vault, or secured in an airship
floating through the sky. An agent can take her system
of interest to the Bureau of Standards device, but she has
good reason to want to bypass that step. The other mea-
surement is an arbitrary POVM, whose effects we denote
by Fj .
As illustrated in Figure 1, we will consider two exper-
imental scenarios, which we will call the “ground path”
and the “sky path.” If we follow the ground path, we take
our system of interest directly to the {Fj} measuring de-
vice, which we will call the measurement on the ground.
If we instead follow the sky path, we will take our system
to the Bureau of Standards measurement, physically ob-
tain a result by performing that measurement, and then
come back down for the second stage, where we conduct
the measurement on the ground.
Suppose that Alice follows the sky path in Figure 1.
FIG. 1: Analysing one scenario in terms of another: An agent
Alice intends to perform an experiment on the ground, whose
outcomes she labels with the index j. The other index, i, la-
bels the outcomes of a “Bureau of Standards” measurement
which Alice could carry out, but which remains unperformed.
Classical physics and quantum physics both allow for Bureau
of Standards measurements, experiments that are informa-
tionally complete in the following sense. If Alice has a set of
probabilities p(i) for the Bureau of Standards measurement
outcomes, she can calculate the proper set of probabilities
q(j) for the outcomes of the ground measurement, using the
conditional probabilities r(j|i).
That is, she physically takes her system of interest and
performs the Bureau of Standards measurement upon it.
Then, she returns the system to the ground and con-
ducts the measurement {Fj} there. Before carrying out
the Bureau of Standards measurement, she has some ex-
pectations for what might happen, which she encodes as
a probability distribution p(i). Obtaining an outcome i,
she updates her state assignment for the system to the
operator Πi. Her expectations for the outcome of the
ground measurement will then be the conditional prob-
abilities r(j|i). Prior to performing the Bureau of Stan-
dards measurement, Alice assigns the probability
Prob(j) =
∑
i
p(i)r(j|i) (22)
to the event of obtaining outcome j when she brings the
system back down to the ground and performs the second
measurement in the sequence.
Classical intuition suggests that Alice should use the
same expression for computing the probability of out-
come j on the ground even if she goes directly to the
ground experiment and does not perform the measure-
ment in the sky. If p(i) is the probability that she would
obtain outcome i were she to perform the sky measure-
5ment, and r(j|i) is the conditional probability for out-
come j if the event i were to occur in the sky, then it
is almost instinctive to calculate the probability of j by
summing p(i)r(j|i). Mathematically, this is not neces-
sarily correct, because the ground path and the sky path
are two different physical scenarios. If C1 and C2 are two
background conditions, then nothing in probability the-
ory forces Prob(j|C1) = Prob(j|C2). Writing q(j) for the
probability of obtaining j by following the ground path,
we have that
q(j) is not necessarily equal to
∑
i
p(i)r(j|i). (23)
It is merely the assumption that an informationally com-
plete measurement must be measuring some pre-existing
physical property of the system that leads Alice to use
Eq. (22) even when she does not physically obtain an
outcome in the sky. In other words, using Eq. (22) to cal-
culate q(j) amounts to assuming that the measurement
outcome i is as good as existing, even when it remains
completely counterfactual.
Probability theory itself does not tell us how to find
q(j) in terms of p(i) and r(j|i). Classical intuition sug-
gests one way of augmenting the abstract formalism of
probability theory: using Eq. (22). The crucial point is
that quantum theory gives us an alternative. It is simply
to use the Born rule, in the form of the urgleichung.
The Born-rule probability for obtaining the outcome
with index j is
q(j) = tr(ρFj) =
∑
i
[
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
]
r(j|i), (24)
where
r(j|i) = tr(ΠiFj). (25)
Note that r(j|i) is also the probability that the Born rule
would tell us to assign to the outcome j if our quantum
state assignment for the system were Πi.
Probability theory is a way to augment our raw expe-
riences of life: It provides a means to manage our ex-
pectations carefully. In turn, quantum theory augments
the mathematics of probability, furnishing links between
quantities that, considering only the formalism of prob-
ability theory, would be unrelated. These new relation-
ships are quantitatively precise, but at variance with clas-
sical intuition, reflecting the principle that unperformed
experiments have no outcomes.
We now explore the consequences of relating mutually
exclusive hypothetical scenarios by the urgleichung. Us-
ing seven assumptions, of which the urgleichung is the
most radical, we will arrive at the fundamental inequal-
ities (19). Because the constants d2 and d + 1 and 1/d
look rather arbitrary at first glance, we will begin with a
more general expression.
Assumption 0. The Generalized Urgleichung. Given
a Bureau of Standards probability distribution {p(i) :
i = 1, . . . , N}, and a matrix of conditional probabilities
r(j|i), we compute the probabilities for an experiment on
the ground by means of
q(j) =
N∑
i=1
[αp(i)− β] r(j|i). (26)
In what follows, this will be our primary means of re-
lating one probability distribution to another. The basic
normalization requirements are∑
i
p(i) = 1,
∑
j
r(j|i) = 1,
∑
j
q(j) = 1. (27)
Normalization relates the constants α, β and N :
α = Nβ + 1. (28)
We denote the set of valid states p by P, and the set
of valid measurements by R. For any p ∈ P and any
r(j|i) ∈ R, the vector q calculated using the urgleichung
is a proper probability distribution.
If we take any r ∈ R and sum over both indices, we
find that ∑
i,j
r(j|i) =
∑
i
1 = N. (29)
Assumption 1. Maximality. The set of all states P and
the set of all measurements R together have the property
that no element can be added to either without introduc-
ing an inconsistency, i.e., a pair (p ∈ P, r ∈ R) for which
the urgleichung yields an invalid probability.
It is sometimes helpful to write the urgleichung in vec-
tor notation:
q = rMp. (30)
Here, r is a matrix whose (j, i) entry is given by r(j|i),
and M is a linear combination of the identity matrix I
and the matrix whose elements all equal 1, the so-called
Hadamard identity J :
M = αI − βJ. (31)
Assumptions 0 and 1 imply a fair bit about the struc-
ture of P and R.
Lemma 1. The set P of all states and the set R of all
measurements are both convex and closed.
Proof. Let p1, p2 ∈ P, and for any r ∈ R, define
q1 = rMp1, q2 = rMp2. (32)
By assumption, both q1 and q2 are valid probability vec-
tors (i.e., they are normalized, and all their entries are
nonnegative). Define
pλ = λp1 + (1− λ)p2. (33)
6Then
qλ = rMpλ = λq1 + (1− λ)q2. (34)
This is a convex combination of points in the probability
simplex, and as such it also belongs to the probability
simplex. By assumption, this holds true for every r ∈
R, and so by maximality, pλ ∈ P. The proofs of the
convexity of R and of closure work analogously.
Consider the case where the ground and sky measure-
ments are the same. In that scenario, we have q = p, and
so the measurement matrix must be the inverse of M :
rF = M
−1 =
1
α
I +
β
α
J. (35)
Note that we have to include rF within R by the maxi-
mality assumption.
The urgleichung is one way that quantum theory builds
upon the mathematics of probability, interconnecting our
previsions for different experiments, previsions that basic
probability theory alone would leave separate. Quantum
theory augments the probability formalism in another
fashion as well, and it is to that which we now turn.
Our next assumption will establish that the set of mea-
surements R can be constructed from the set of states P.
On a purely mathematical level, we could justify this by
saying that we wish to build the most parsimonious the-
ory possible upon the urgleichung, and so we simplify
matters by having one fundamental set instead of two.
As far as constructing a mathematical theory goes, this
is certainly a legitimate way to begin. We can, however,
provide a more physical motivation than that.
Probability theory, intrinsically, assumes very little
about the structure of event spaces. With it, we can
for example discuss rolling a die and recording the side
that lands facing up; we say that the realm of possible
outcomes for this experiment is the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
In this experiment, the outcome “1” is no more like the
outcome “2” than it is like the outcome “6”. We can as-
cribe probabilities to these six potential events without
imposing a similarity metric upon the realm of outcomes.
We use integers as labels, but we care hardly at all about
the number-theoretic properties of those integers. When
we roll the die, we are indifferent to the fact that 5 is
prime and 6 is perfect. Nor is the event of observing a
particular integer in this experiment related, necessarily,
to the event of observing that same integer in a different
experiment.
When Alice first learns probability theory, she picks
up this habit of tagging events with integers. If Alice
considers a long catalogue of experiments that she could
perform, she might label the possible outcomes of the first
experiment by the integers from 1 to N1, the outcomes
of the second experiment by the integers {1, . . . , N2} and
so on. But, in general, Alice has the freedom to permute
these labels as she pleases. She does not have to regard
the experience of obtaining j = 17 in one experiment
as similar to the experience of obtaining j = 17 in any
other.
But what if Alice wants more structure than this?
When Alice contemplates an experiment that she might
carry out, she considers a set of possible outcomes for
it, i.e., a realm of potential experiences which that ac-
tion might elicit. She can assign each of those potential
experiences a label drawn from whatever mathematical
population she desires. Her index set for a given exper-
iment can be a subset of whatever population she finds
convenient. When Alice adopts the urgleichung as an
empirically-motivated addition to the bare fundamentals
of probability theory, does she, by that act, also gain a
natural collection of mathematical entities from which to
build index sets?
In fact, she has just such a collection at hand: She can
use the set of valid states, P!
To consider the matter more deeply, we ask the follow-
ing question: Under what conditions would Alice con-
sider two outcomes of two different experiments to be
equivalent? For example, Alice contemplates two exper-
iments she might feasibly perform, which she describes
by two matrices r and r′. When would Alice treat an
outcome j of experiment r to be equivalent to an out-
come j′ of r′ [4]? Generally, the tools she has on hand
to make such a judgment are her probability ascriptions
for those outcomes. If her overall mesh of beliefs is that
her probability of experiencing j upon enacting r is the
same as her probability for finding j′ when enacting r′,
no matter what her state assignment p, then she has good
grounds to call j and j′ equivalent. In order to satisfy
q(j) = q′(j′) for all p ∈ P, the measurement matrices r
and r′ must obey
r(j|i) = r′(j′|i), ∀i. (36)
The simplest way to ensure that this is possible is to
build all elements r of the set R from a common vocab-
ulary. When we construct an element r ∈ R, we draw
each row from a shared pool of ingredients. The natural,
parsimonious choice we have on hand for this purpose
is the set P. This means that, up to scaling, measure-
ment outcomes are actually identified with points in the
probability simplex.
Let r ∈ R be a valid measurement. If each row of
the matrix {r(j|i)} can also naturally be identified with
a vector s ∈ P, then we are led to consider the vector s
sitting inside r in some fashion. The simplest reasonable
relation between s, which is a vector with N elements,
and the measurement matrix r, whose rows have length
N , is to have a row of r be linearly proportional to s.
Assumption 2. Measurement Matrices are Constructed
from States. Given any r ∈ R, we can write a row
{r(j|i) : i = 1, . . . , N} as a vector sj ∈ P, up to a nor-
malization factor:
r(j|i) = Nγjsj(i). (37)
Furthermore, any state in P can be used in this manner.
7For brevity, we will refer to the sj as “measurement
vectors.” We will shortly identify the meaning of the
constants {γj}, which we have written with the prefactor
N for later convenience.
Assumption 3. Possibility of Maximal Ignorance. The
state c, defined by
c(i) =
1
N
∀ i, (38)
belongs to P.
This can be deduced from other postulates, but the
state c is a useful tool, and it is helpful to point its exis-
tence out explicitly. For example, substituting the state
of complete ignorance c into the urgleichung, we obtain
q(j) =
1
N
∑
i
r(j|i). (39)
What is the meaning of the factors {γj}? To find out,
we apply a measurement r ∈ R to the state c:
q(j) =
1
N
∑
i
r(j|i) = γj
∑
i
sj(i) = γj . (40)
The factors {γj} indicate the probability of obtaining the
jth outcome on the ground when the agent is completely
indifferent to the potential outcomes of the sky experi-
ment.
If the effect of some r ∈ R, when applied via the ur-
gleichung, is to send c to itself, then we have that
c(j) =
1
N
=
1
N
∑
i
r(j|i)⇒
∑
i
r(j|i) = 1. (41)
Combined with the basic normalization requirement for
conditional probabilities, this states that a measurement
that preserves c is represented by a doubly stochastic ma-
trix.
Lemma 2. Measurements that send the state c to itself
are represented by doubly stochastic matrices.
When we postulated the urgleichung, we added struc-
ture to the bare essentials of probability theory, and the
structure we added related one experiment to another in
a way above and beyond basic coherence. With Assump-
tion 2, we are also interrelating different experiments. We
can appreciate this in another way by considering what
it means for a physical system to be usable as a scientific
instrument.
What conditions must an object meet in order to qual-
ify as a piece of laboratory apparatus? Classically, a bare
minimum requirement is that the object has a set of dis-
tinguishable configurations in which it can exist. These
might be positions of a pointer needle, heights of a mer-
cury column, patterns of glowing lights and so forth. The
essential point is that the system can be in different con-
figurations at different times: A thermometer that always
reports the same temperature is useless. We can label
these distinguishable configurations by an index j. The
calibration process for a laboratory instrument is a proce-
dure by which a scientist assigns conditional probabilities
r(j|i) to the instrument, relating the readout states j to
the inputs i. In order to make progress, we habitually
assume that nature is not so perverse that the results of
the calibration phase become completely irrelevant when
we proceed to the next step and apply the instrument to
new systems of unknown character.
But what if nature is perverse? Not enough so to for-
bid the possibility of science, but enough to make life
interesting. Quantitatively speaking, what if we must
modify the everyday assumption that one can carry the
results of a calibration process unchanged from one ex-
perimental context to another?
The urgleichung is just such a modification. The
{r(j|i)} do not become irrelevant when we move from
the sky context to the ground, but we do have to use
them in a different way.
In quantum physics, we no longer treat “measurement”
as a passive reading-off of a specified, pre-existing physi-
cal quantity. However, we do still have a counterpart for
our classical notion of a system that can qualify as a lab-
oratory apparatus. Instead of asking whether the system
can exist in one of multiple possible classical states, we
ask whether our overall mesh of beliefs allows us to con-
sistently assign any one of multiple possible catalogues
of expectations. That is, if an agent Alice wishes to use
a system as a laboratory apparatus, she must be able to
say now that she can conceive of ascribing any one of
several states to it at a later time. We define a discrete
apparatus as a physical system with an associated set of
states,
{s1, . . . , sm} ⊂ P. (42)
The analogue of classical uncertainty about where a
pointer might be pointing is the convex combination of
the states {sj}. Therefore, our basic mental model of a
laboratory apparatus is a polytope in P, with the {sj}
as its vertices. Assumption 2 says that Alice can pick up
any such apparatus and use it as a “prosthetic hand” to
enrich her experience of asking questions of nature.
We can think of Assumption 2 in another way, if we
rewrite Eq. (37) in the following manner:
sj(i) =
(
1
N
)
r(j|i)
γj
. (43)
Earlier, we noted that γj is the probability of obtaining
the jth outcome on the ground, given complete ignorance
about the potential outcomes of the sky experiment. In
addition, 1/N is the probability assigned to each outcome
of the sky experiment by the state of complete ignorance.
So,
sj(i) =
PrCI(i) r(j|i)
PrCI(j)
, (44)
8where the notation “PrCI” here indicates a probability
assignment given that the state for the sky experiment
is c. Note that PrCI(j|i) = r(j|i). But this means that
the expression on the right-hand side above is just the
ordinary Bayes formula for inverting conditional proba-
bilities:
PrCI(i|j) = PrCI(i) PrCI(j|i)
PrCI(j)
. (45)
Therefore, we can interpret the mathematical relation es-
tablished in Assumption 2 as saying that “posteriors from
maximal ignorance are priors” [1]. For the remainder of
this paper, we will not be considering in detail the rules
for changing one’s probabilities upon new experiences—
a rather intricate subject, all things told [39, 40]. So,
we will not stress the ideas of “priors” and “posteriors,”
but it is good to know that this reading of Assumption 2
exists.
Writing the urgleichung in terms of the vector sj ,
q(j) =
∑
i
[αp(i)− β]Nγjsj(i) (46)
= Nαγj〈p, sj〉 −Nβγj . (47)
The fact that q(j) must be nonnegative for all j implies
a lower bound on the scalar product 〈p, sj〉:
〈p, sj〉 ≥ β
α
. (48)
The measurement described by the matrix rF in
Eq. (35) yields, by construction, equal probabilities for
all outcomes given the input state c. That is, it is an
experiment with N outcomes, and γj = 1/N for all of
them. Therefore, we can take the rows of rF as specify-
ing N special vectors within P. We have that
rF (j|i) = ej(i), (49)
where the vector ej is flat across all but one entries:
ej(i) =
1
α
(δji + β). (50)
We will refer to the vectors {ek} as the basis distributions.
What happens if we take a measurement r ∈ R, and
act with it via the urgleichung upon a basis distribution
ek? The result is straightforwardly computed to be
q(j) =
∑
i
[
α
(
β
α
+
1
α
δik
)
− β
]
r(j|i) (51)
= β
∑
i
r(j|i) +
∑
i
δikr(j|i)− β
∑
i
r(j|i) (52)
= r(j|k). (53)
This will be useful later.
Note that the basis distributions all have magnitude
equal to
〈ek, ek〉 = 1 + 2β +Nβ
2
α2
. (54)
This result singles out a distinguished length scale in
probability space, namely, the radius of the sphere on
which all the basis distributions live.
The lower bound (48) suggests the following construc-
tion. Let H be the hyperplane of vectors in RN that sum
to unity:
H =
{
v ∈ RN : 〈v, c〉 = 1
N
}
. (55)
This hyperplane includes the probability simplex. For
any set A of probability distributions, consider the set
A∗ =
{
u ∈ H : 〈u, v〉 ≥ β
α
∀v ∈ A
}
. (56)
This set includes all the probability distributions that are
consistent with each point in A, with respect to the lower
bound we derived from the urgleichung. We will desig-
nate the set A∗ the polar of A, following the terminology
for a related concept in geometry [28, 29]. Let P be the
set of all valid states. The set of all measurement vectors
that are consistent with these states, with respect to the
lower bound, is that portion of the polar of P that lies
within the probability simplex:
P∗ ∩∆ =
{
s : 〈s, p〉 ≥ β
α
∀p ∈ P
}
∩∆. (57)
If some s in this set is not in the set P, then some mea-
surement vector does not correspond to a state. Likewise,
if some p ∈ P is not in this set, then that state cannot
correspond to a measurement vector. Both of these cases
violate the mapping we have advocated on general con-
ceptual grounds. Therefore, our first three assumptions
imply that we consider sets P for which
P = P∗ ∩∆. (58)
We will see momentarily how to simplify this condition,
establishing the condition that a state space P must be
self-polar:
P = P∗. (59)
In order to prove this proposition, we need to know
more about the operation of taking the polar. We can
derive the relations we require by adapting some re-
sults from the higher-dimensional geometry literature.
Gru¨nbaum [28] defines the polar of A ⊆ Rd2 to be the
set
A◦ = {u ∈ Rd2 : 〈u, v〉 ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ A}. (60)
Our definition of the polar A∗ is close enough to this
definition of A◦ that many results about the latter can
be carried over with little effort. The properties of the
polar A∗ are summarized in the following theorem.
9Theorem 3. For all A ⊆ H, the polar A∗ is a closed,
convex set containing c. Since we will frequently be invok-
ing the concept of convex hulls, we introduce the notation
cc(A) for the closed, convex hull of the set A. We have
A∗ =
(
cc(A ∪ {c}))∗, (61)
A∗∗ = cc(A ∪ {c}), (62)
for all A ⊆ H. In particular, A is equal to its double
polar A∗∗ if and only if it is closed, convex and contains
c.
For all A, B ⊆ H
A ⊆ B =⇒ B∗ ⊆ A∗. (63)
If A is an arbitrary family of subsets of H then( ⋃
A∈A
A
)∗
=
⋂
A∈A
A∗. (64)
If, in addition, A∗∗ = A for all A ∈ A then( ⋂
A∈A
A
)∗
= cc
( ⋃
A∈A
A∗
)
. (65)
Proof. All these properties follow by relating Gru¨nbaum’s
definition of the polar with ours. Let f : RN → RN be
the affine map defined by
f(u) = Nα(u− c), (66)
and let H0 be the subspace
H0 = {u ∈ RN : 〈u, c〉 = 0}. (67)
One then has
A∗ = f−1
((−f(A))◦ ∩H0) (68)
for all A ⊆ H. With this in hand the theorem becomes
a straightforward consequence of textbook results.
Now, consider the relation P = P∗ ∩∆, and take the
polar of both sides:
P∗ = (P∗ ∩∆)∗ = cc (P∗∗ ∪∆∗N ) . (69)
We know that P is closed and convex, and that it contains
the center point c. Therefore,
P∗∗ = P. (70)
What is the polar of the probability simplex ∆? In fact,
it is the basis simplex ∆e.
Lemma 4. The probability simplex and the basis simplex
are mutually polar:
∆∗ = ∆e, ∆∗e = ∆. (71)
Proof. The probability simplex contains normalized vec-
tors, so it lies in the hyperplane H, and all of its vectors
have wholly nonnegative entries. Let vi be the i
th vertex
of ∆ (so vi(j) = δij). Then the probability simplex is
∆ = {u ∈ H : 〈u, vi〉 ≥ 0 ∀i}. (72)
Let f : H → H be the affine map defined by
f(u) =
1
α
u+
β
α
. (73)
Then ∆e = f(∆). It follows that
∆e =
{
u ∈ H : 〈u, vi〉 ≥ β
α
∀i
}
. (74)
Taking account of Theorem 3 we deduce
∆e = {vi : i = 1, . . . , N}∗ = ∆∗. (75)
The fact that ∆∗e = ∆ is an immediate consequence of
this and the fact that the double polar of a closed convex
set is itself (see Theorem 3).
Theorem 5. A state space P satisfying Assumptions 0,
1, 2 and 3 is self-polar:
P = P∗. (76)
Proof. We already know that
P∗ = cc (P∗∗ ∪∆∗) , (77)
and now we can say that
P∗ = cc(P ∪∆e). (78)
But we established already that P always contains the
basis distributions, and that P is closed and convex.
Therefore, P is self-polar.
The fact that a state space is self-polar implies the ex-
istence of two more distinguished length scales. To see
why, it is helpful to work in barycentric coordinates, shift-
ing all our vectors so that the origin lies at the barycenter
point of the simplex, the point c:
p→ p′ = p− c. (79)
In these coordinates, our lower bound (48) becomes
〈p′, s′〉 ≥ − 1
Nα
. (80)
Any basis distribution ej satisfies〈
e′j , e
′
j
〉
=
N − 1
Nα2
. (81)
We define the out-sphere So to be the sphere centered on
the barycenter with radius
r2o =
N − 1
Nα2
. (82)
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The ball bounded by So is the out-ball Bo. We will see
shortly that the polar of the out-ball is a ball centered at
the barycenter and having radius
r2i =
1
N(N − 1) . (83)
We designate this ball the in-ball Bi, and its surface is
the in-sphere Si. Finally, note that if we take
r2m =
1
Nα
, (84)
any two points both lying within rm of the barycenter
will be consistent with respect to the bound (48). This
defines the mid-ball Bm and its surface, the mid-sphere
Sm. It follows that
riro = r
2
m. (85)
We now prove the fact we stated a moment ago.
Lemma 6. The out- and in-balls are mutually polar:
B∗o = Bi, B
∗
i = Bo. (86)
Proof. Let f : H → H be the affine map defined by
f(u) = c+
ro
ri
(u− c). (87)
Then f(Bi) = Bo. Consequently, given arbitrary u ∈ H,
u ∈ B∗o (88)
⇐⇒ 〈u, f(v)〉 ≥ β
α
∀v ∈ Bi (89)
⇐⇒ 〈u− c, f(v)− c〉 ≥ −rori ∀v ∈ Bi (90)
⇐⇒ 〈u− c, v − c〉 ≥ −r2i ∀v ∈ Bi (91)
⇐⇒ u ∈ Bi (92)
So B∗o = Bi. The fact that B
∗
i = Bo is an immediate
consequence of this and the fact that the double polar of
a closed convex set is itself.
These distinguished length scales suggest another as-
sumption we ought to make about our state space. Ear-
lier, we stated that the barycenter c must belong to our
set of admissible probability distributions. It is natural
to ask how far away from complete ignorance we can go
before we encounter complications. Can our state space
P contain all the points in a little ball around c? Intu-
itively, it is hard to see why not. How big can we make
that ball around the center point c before we run into
trouble? The simplest assumption, in this context, is
to postulate that the first complication we encounter is
the edge of the probability simplex itself. Where does a
sphere centered at c touch the faces of the simplex? The
center of a face of the probability simplex is found by
taking the average of N − 1 of its vertices:
v¯k(i) =
1
N − 1(1− δik). (93)
The sphere centered on c that just touches these points
has a radius given by
(v¯k − c)2 = 1
N(N − 1) . (94)
The in-sphere Si is just the inscribed sphere of the prob-
ability simplex.
Assumption 4. Every state space P contains the in-ball.
Because the polar of the in-ball is the out-ball, and
polarity reverses inclusion, it follows that every self-
consistent state space is bounded by the out-sphere. This
result has the form of an “uncertainty principle”: It
means that our probability distributions can never be-
come too narrowly focused. For any two points p and s
within our state space P, we have
L ≤ 〈p, s〉 ≤ U, (95)
where the lower and upper bounds are given by
L = − 1
Nα
+
1
N
, (96)
U =
N − 1
Nα2
+
1
N
. (97)
Recall from Lemma 4 that the polar of the probability
simplex is the simplex defined by the basis distributions
ek, which in barycentric coordinates is seen to be the
probability simplex rescaled:
e′k(i) = ek(i)− c(i) =
1
α
(δik − c(i)) . (98)
Call two extremal states p and s in a state space max-
imally distant if they saturate the lower bound:
〈p′, s′〉 = − 1
Nα
. (99)
Let
{p′k : k = 1, . . . ,m} (100)
be a set of Mutually Maximally Distant (MMD) states.
That is, for all k,
〈p′k, p′k〉 = r2o, (101)
and for k 6= l,
〈p′k, p′l〉 = −r2m. (102)
Construct the vector quantity
V =
∑
k
p′k. (103)
From the fact that the magnitude 〈V, V 〉 ≥ 0, it follows
that
m ≤ 1 + r
2
o
r2m
. (104)
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Substituting in the definitions of the radii, we arrive at
the relation
m ≤ 1 + N − 1
α
. (105)
Let us now make an assumption: We want this bound to
be attainable.
Assumption 5. A state space P contains an MMD set
of size
mmax = 1 +
N − 1
α
. (106)
Note that both N and mmax are positive integers by
assumption. This means that α must divide N−1 neatly.
To set the context for our next assumption, switch back
to the original frame. Recall that any two points p and
s within our state space P satisfy
L ≤ 〈p, s〉 ≤ U, (107)
where the lower and upper bounds are given by
L = − 1
Nα
+
1
N
, (108)
U =
N − 1
Nα2
+
1
N
. (109)
Comparing these two quantities, and using Eq. (106) to
simplify, we obtain
U
L
= 1 +
mmax
α− 1 , (110)
where mmax is a positive integer. This expression makes
it inviting to set the ratio on the right-hand side to unity
by fixing
mmax = α− 1, (111)
and thus U/L = 2 is, in a sense, the natural first option
to explore.
Assumption 6. The upper and lower bounds in the fun-
damental inequalities are related by
U = 2L. (112)
This lets us solve for N in terms of α:
N = (α− 1)2. (113)
Thanks to our two latest assumptions, we can fix all three
parameters in the generalized urgleichung (26) in terms
of the maximal size of an MMD set:
N = m2max, α = mmax + 1, β =
1
mmax
. (114)
Relabeling mmax by d for brevity, we recover the for-
mulas familiar from the SIC representation of quantum
state space. Here, the generalized urgleichung takes the
specific form
q(j) =
∑
i
[
(d+ 1)p(i)− 1
d
]
r(j|i), (115)
and we arrive at the following pair of inequalities:
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ 〈p, s〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (116)
Consequently, the polar of a set A is
A∗ =
{
u ∈ H : 〈u, v〉 ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
∀v ∈ A
}
. (117)
We now arrive at the definition upon which the rest of
our theory will stand.
Definition 1. A qplex is a self-polar subset of the out-
ball in the probability simplex ∆d2 , with the parameters
in the generalized urgleichung set to α = (d + 1) and
β = 1/d.
III. FUNDAMENTAL GEOMETRY OF
QPLEXES
In the previous section, we began with the urgleichung
and, making a few assumptions of an operational char-
acter, arrived at the double inequality
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ 〈p, s〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (118)
Here, we will take this as established, and we will demon-
strate several important geometrical properties of the
sets that maximally satisfy it—the qplexes.
A qplex is a subset of ∆, the probability simplex in
Rd2 (i.e. the space of probability distributions with d2
outcomes). ∆ is, in turn, a subset of the hyperplane
H =
{
u ∈ Rd2 : 〈u, c〉 = 1
d2
}
, (119)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the usual scalar product on Rd2 and
c =
(
1
d2 . . .
1
d2
)T
(120)
is the barycenter of ∆.
It is important to appreciate the geometrical relation-
ships between the four sets ∆,∆e, Bo, Bi. Specializing
our results from the previous section, we have
ei − c = 1
d+ 1
(vi − c), (121)
ri =
1
d− 1ro. (122)
So the basis simplex is obtained from the probability
simplex by scaling by a factor 1/(d + 1), while the in-
ball is obtained from the out-ball by scaling by a factor
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1/(d − 1). In particular Bi = Bo when d = 2, but is
otherwise strictly smaller. We have
〈ej , ek〉 = dδjk + d+ 2
d(d+ 1)2
. (123)
If d = 2 then
∆e ⊆ Bi = Bo ⊆ ∆. (124)
If d > 2 then one still has
∆e ∪Bi ⊆ ∆ ∩Bo (125)
but
∆e * Bi, Bo * ∆. (126)
The first of these statements is an immediate consequence
of the foregoing. To prove the second observe that ei ∈
∆e but /∈ Bi, while c+ (ro/ri)(e¯i − c) ∈ Bo but /∈ ∆.
These facts are perhaps most easily appreciated by ex-
amining the diagram in Fig. 2. Observe, however, that
the metric relations are impossible to reproduce in a 2-
dimensional diagram. So, although Fig. 2 reproduces the
inclusion relations, and points of contact, it badly mis-
represents the sizes of the sets ∆e, Bi in comparison to
the sets ∆, Bo. ΔΔe
SoSi
FIG. 2: Relations between the sets ∆, ∆e, So, Si when d >
2. The diagram is schematic only. It shows the inclusion
relations, and points of contact, but does not reproduce the
metric relations, which are impossible to depict accurately in
a 2-dimensional diagram. In particular, the basis simplex ∆e
is much smaller in relation to the probability simplex ∆ than
is shown here. This is also true of the in-sphere Si and the
out-sphere So.
General properties of qplexes include the following:
• Any qplex is convex and closed, and is thus the
convex hull of its extremal points.
• Because a qplex is self-polar, it can be thought of
as the intersection of half-spaces. Each half-space
is defined, per Eq. (117), by a hyperplane that is
composed of points all maximally distant from an
extreme point of the qplex.
• For every extreme point of a qplex, there exists
at least one point that is maximally distant to
it, in the sense of saturating the lower bound in
Eq. (118).
• Call a vector p ∈ Q a pure vector if 〈p, p〉 =
2/(d(d + 1)). Any set of pure vectors that pair-
wise saturate the lower bound of the consistency
condition (118) contains no more than d elements.
• Suppose we have a qplex Q that is a polytope, i.e.,
the convex hull of a finite set of vertices. Because all
qplexes contain the basis distributions, this poly-
tope must have at least d2 vertices. The polar of
each extreme point is a half-space bounded by a hy-
perplane, all of the points on which are maximally
distant from that extreme point. The intersection
of the half-spaces defined by all these hyperplanes
forms a polytope. By self-polarity, this polytope is
identical to Q. It follows that each extreme point
of Q must lie on at least d2 − 1 such hyperplanes.
Therefore, each vertex of Q is maximally distant
from at least d2 − 1 other extreme points.
• It follows from the above that a qplex cannot be
a simplex. Consequently, any point in the interior
of a qplex can be written in more than one way as
a convex combination of points on the boundary.
This is a generalization of the result that any mixed
quantum state has multiple convex decompositions
into different sets of pure states, a theorem that has
historically been of some significance in interpreting
the quantum formalism [23–26]. Also, a result of
Pla´vala implies that any qplex admits incompatible
measurements [27].
• If Q is a qplex, then no vector p ∈ Q can have an
element whose value exceeds 1/d.
• The total number of zero-valued entries in any
vector belonging to a qplex is bounded above by
d(d− 1)/2.
A SIC representation of a quantum state space is a
qplex with a continuous set of pure points. All qplexes
with this property enjoy an interesting geometrical re-
lation with the polytopes that can be inscribed within
them.
Theorem 7. If Q is a qplex that contains an infinite
number of pure points, then any polytope inscribed in Q
cannot contain the in-sphere Si.
Proof. Suppose that P is a polytope inscribed in Q that
contains the in-sphere Si. Recall that the polarity opera-
tion reverses inclusion (Theorem 3), so the polar polytope
P ∗ of P must contain the polar Q∗ of Q. But all qplexes
are self-polar, so Q ⊂ P ∗. Likewise, because the polar
of the in-ball Bi is the out-ball Bo, it follows that P
∗ is
contained within the out-sphere So. Consequently, Q can
have only a finite number of pure points.
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Let us consider the two-outcome measurement rs de-
fined by rescaling a state s ∈ Q:
rs(0|i) = d2γ0s(i), γ0 = 1
d
. (127)
We fix the other row of the matrix rs(j|i) by normaliza-
tion:
r(0|i) + r(1|i) = 1. (128)
Does this actually define a legitimate measurement? Be-
cause 〈p, s〉 is always bounded above and below for any
vector p ∈ P, then applying rs to any p ∈ P via the urgle-
ichung will yield a valid probability vector q. Therefore,
rs defined in this way is indeed a member of R.
What’s more, if we apply rs to the state s itself, then
we can be certain about the outcome, if s lies on the
same sphere as the basis distributions. In such a case,
we have q(0) = 1. If Alice ascribes a state having this
magnitude to a system, she is asserting her confidence
that performing a particular experiment will have a spe-
cific result. But certainty about one experiment does
not, and indeed cannot, imply certainty about all. Even
when Alice is certain about what would happen should
she perform the experiment rs, she is necessarily uncer-
tain about what would happen if she brought the Bureau
of Standards measurement down to the ground and ap-
plied it.
Note that when we apply rs to a state p, we compute
q(0) = d(d+ 1)〈p, s〉 − 1. (129)
The bound established by Assumption 4 implies that we
can associate the factor d just as well with s or with p.
That is, both rs and rp are valid measurements within R,
and we obtain the same probability q(0) when we apply
rs to p as we would if we applied rp to the state s.
This is a point worth considering in depth. With As-
sumption 2, we introduced a relation between the set of
all states and the set of all measurements. Now, thanks
to the additional assumptions we have invoked since then,
we have a more specific correspondence between the two
sets: For every pure state, there is a binary measure-
ment for which that state, and no other state, implies
certainty. This result depends upon our assumption that
departures from complete ignorance are minimally con-
strained, or equivalently, that the basis distributions are
extremal. As a consequence, we know that we can take
any valid state s and scale by a factor d to create a row in
a measurement matrix. In the language of Asher Peres,
the fact that we can interpret Eq. (129) as rs applied
to p or as rp applied to s, for any states p and s, is the
reciprocity of “preparations” and “tests” [41].
This reciprocity is an important concept for many
mathematical treatments of quantum physics. For ex-
ample, it is one of the primary axioms in Haag’s for-
mulation [42, 43]. To those who apply category theory
to quantum mechanics, it is the reason why they con-
struct “dagger-categories,” and how the basic idea of an
inner product is introduced into their diagrammatic lan-
guage [33].
Next, we consider sets which are related to qplexes.
Definition 2. A subset A of the probability simplex ∆ is
a germ if it satisfies the fundamental inequalities (116)
for all p, s ∈ A.
Definition 3. A germ is maximal if no point can be
added to it without violating the fundamental inequal-
ities (116).
We start by proving two results about germs that fol-
low from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. Originally,
these theorems were proved for qplexes [1, 2, 19], but
they apply more broadly.
Theorem 8. If G is a germ, then no vector p ∈ G can
have an element whose value exceeds 1/d.
Proof. Let p ∈ G be a point on the out-sphere. Assume
without loss of generality that p(0) ≥ p(i). Then
2
d(d+ 1)
= p(0)2 +
d2−1∑
i=1
p(i)2, (130)
and using the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
2
d(d+ 1)
≥ p(0)2 + 1
d2 − 1
d2−1∑
i=1
p(i)
2 . (131)
By normalization, we can simplify the sum in the last
term, yielding
2
d(d+ 1)
≥ p(0)2 + 1
d2 − 1 (1− p(0))
2
. (132)
Thus,
p(0) ≤ 1
d
, (133)
with equality if and only if all the other p(i) are equal, in
which case, normalization forces them to take the value
1/(d(d+ 1)).
Remark. If the germ G contains the basis distributions,
this result also follows from
〈p, ek〉 = 1
d(d+ 1)
+
pk
d+ 1
≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (134)
Theorem 9. The total number of zero-valued entries in
any vector belonging to a germ is bounded above by d(d−
1)/2.
Proof. Let G be a germ and choose p ∈ G. Square the
basic normalization condition to find(∑
i
p(i)
)2
= 1. (135)
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Apply the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality to show, writing
n0 for the number of zero-valued elements in p,
(d2 − n0)
∑
{i:p(i)>0}
p(i)2 ≥
 ∑
{i:p(i)>0}
p(i)
2 = 1. (136)
Consequently,
n0 ≤ d2 − d(d+ 1)
2
=
d(d− 1)
2
. (137)
It follows from Zorn’s lemma [44] that every germ is
contained in at least one maximal germ. In other words,
we can extend any germ in at least one way to form a set
that is also a germ, but which admits no further consis-
tent extension. Adding any new point to a maximal germ
implies that some pair of points will violate the inequali-
ties (116). Every qplex is a germ, but the converse is not
true. Using the theory of polarity, we will show that any
maximal germ is a self-polar subset of the out-ball. That
is, a maximal germ is a qplex, and in fact, any qplex is
also a maximal germ.
It is an immediate consequence of the definition that
if G is an arbitrary germ then
G ⊆ ∆ ∩Bo, (138)
where Bo is the out-ball:
Bo =
{
u ∈ H : 〈u, u〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
}
(139)
= {u ∈ H : ‖u− c‖ ≤ ro} . (140)
Taking polars on both sides of Eq. (138) and taking ac-
count of what polarity does to inclusion and intersection
(Theorem 3), we find
cc(∆∗ ∪B∗o) ⊆ G∗ (141)
for every germ G. Recall from Lemma 4 that the po-
lar of ∆ is the basis simplex ∆e, and by Lemma 6 we
know that the polar of the out-ball Bo is the in-ball Bi.
Therefore,
cc(∆e ∪Bi) ⊆ G∗. (142)
We are now able to prove
Theorem 10. Let A be a subset of ∆ ∩Bo. Then
1. A is a germ if and only if A ⊆ A∗.
2. A is a maximal germ if and only if A = A∗.
Therefore, the terms “maximal germ” and “qplex” are
equivalent.
Proof. The first statement is an immediate consequence
of the definition. To prove the second statement we need
to do a little work. This is because it is not immediately
apparent that if A is a maximal germ then A∗ ⊆ Bo.
Suppose that A is a maximal germ. We know from
the first part of the theorem that A ⊆ A∗. To prove the
reverse inclusion let u ∈ A∗ be arbitrary. In order to
show that u ∈ A first consider the vector
u˜ = c− ri‖u− c‖ (u− c). (143)
We have, for all v ∈ A,
−riro ≤ 〈u˜− c, v − c〉 ≤ riro, (144)
implying
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ 〈u˜, v〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (145)
Also
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ 〈u˜, u˜〉 = 1
d2 − 1 ≤
2
d(d+ 1)
. (146)
So u˜ ∈ A. We now use this to show that u ∈ A. In fact
−ri‖u− c‖ = 〈u− c, u˜− c〉
= 〈u, u˜〉 − 1
d2
≥ −riro (147)
implying u ∈ Bo. Consequently
〈u, v〉 = 〈u− c, v − c〉+ 1
d2
≤ r2o +
1
d2
=
2
d(d+ 1)
(148)
for all v ∈ A. The fact that u ∈ A∗ means
〈u, v〉 ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
(149)
for all v ∈ A. Finally
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ ‖u− c‖2 + 1
d2
= 〈u, u〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (150)
So u ∈ A. This completes the proof that if A is a maximal
germ then A = A∗. The converse statement, that if
A = A∗ then A is a maximal germ, is an immediate
consequence of the definition.
Let us note that this theorem means, in particular, that
every maximal germ contains the basis simplex. If we
start with the fundamental inequalities and assume that
the set of points satisfying them is maximal, then that
set turns out to be self-polar. Because the state space is
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contained within the probability simplex, the state space
must contain the polar of the probability simplex, which
by Lemma 4 is the basis simplex. In earlier papers on
germs [1, 2, 19], the existence of the basis distributions
was an extra assumption in addition to maximality; here,
using the concept of polarity, we have been able to derive
it.
Let us also note, as another consequence of this theo-
rem, that if Q is a maximal germ, and if q is any element
of Q, then there exists a measurement r and index a such
that q = sa, where sa is the distribution
sa(j) =
r(a|j)∑
k r(a|k)
. (151)
This too was something that was assumed in older
work [1, 2, 19], but which we are now in a position to
derive. To see that it is true observe that the statement
is trivial if q = c (simply take r to be the one-outcome
measurement). If, on the other hand, q 6= c we can define
q′ = c− ri‖q − c‖ (q − c). (152)
By construction q′ ∈ Si. So it follows from the theorem
that q′ ∈ Q. Consequently, if we define
r(a|i) =
{
d2ri
‖q−c‖+ri q(i) a = 1
d2‖q−c‖
‖q−c‖+ri q
′(i) a = 2
(153)
then r describes a two-outcome measurement such that
r(1|i)∑
k r(1|k)
= q(i),
r(2|i)∑
k r(2|k)
= q′(i). (154)
At this stage, we turn to the question of what germs
can have in common, and how they can differ. In order to
develop this topic, we introduce some more definitions.
Given an arbitrary germ G, let QG denote the set of all
qplexes containing G (necessarily nonempty, as we noted
above).
Definition 4. The stem of a germ G is the set
S(G) =
⋂
Q∈QG
Q, (155)
and the envelope of G is the set
E(G) =
⋃
Q∈QG
Q. (156)
When G is the empty set Q∅ is the set of all qplexes,
without restriction. In that case we omit the subscript
and simply denote it Q. Similarly we write S(∅) = S and
E(∅) = E. We will refer to S and E as the principal stem
and envelope.
Theorem 11. Let G be a germ. Then
S(G) = cc(∆e ∪Bi ∪G), (157)
E(G) = ∆ ∩Bo ∩G∗. (158)
In particular, S(G) and E(G) are mutually polar.
Proof. If Q is a qplex containing G we must have Q =
Q∗ ⊆ ∆ ∩Bo ∩G∗. So
E(G) ⊆ ∆ ∩Bo ∩G∗. (159)
On the other hand if p is any point in ∆ ∩Bo ∩G∗ then
G ∪ {p} is a germ, and so must be contained in some
Q ∈ QG. The second statement now follows.
To prove the first statement we take duals on both
sides of ⋃
Q∈QG
Q = ∆ ∩Bo ∩G∗. (160)
We find
S(G) = cc
(
∆e ∪Bi ∪ cc
(
G ∪ {c}))
= cc(∆e ∪Bi ∪G). (161)
Corollary 12. The principal stem and envelope are
given by
S = cc(∆e ∪Bi), (162)
E = ∆ ∩Bo. (163)
Proof. Immediate.
This result is illustrated schematically in Figure 3.
FIG. 3: The principal stem and envelope when d > 2. The
sets ∆, ∆e, So, Si are shown in gray. The surface of every
qplex lies between the blue and red surfaces. As with Fig. 2
the diagram is schematic only. In particular, the total mea-
sure of the set S is much smaller in comparison with the total
measure of the set E than the diagram suggests.
Corollary 13. Let G be a closed, convex germ contain-
ing S. Then
S(G) = G E(G) = G∗ (164)
Moreover, given arbitrary p ∈ G∗ such that p /∈ G there
exist qplexes Q1, Q2 containing G such that
p /∈ Q1 p ∈ Q2 (165)
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Proof. Immediate.
Every germ can be extended to a qplex. It is natural to
ask how many ways there are of performing the extension.
The following theorem provides a partial answer to that
question.
Theorem 14. Let G be a closed, convex germ containing
S. If G is not already a qplex, then there are uncountably
many qplexes containing G.
Proof. It will be convenient to begin by introducing some
notation. Given any two points p1, p2 ∈ H we define
[p1, p2] = {λp1 + (1− λ)p2 : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1} (166)
(p1, p2] = {λp1 + (1− λ)p2 : 0 < λ ≤ 1} (167)
[p1, p2) = {λp1 + (1− λ)p2 : 0 ≤ λ < 1} (168)
(p1, p2) = {λp1 + (1− λ)p2 : 0 < λ < 1} (169)
Turning to the proof, suppose that G is not a qplex.
Then we can choose p ∈ G∗ such that p /∈ G. Let q be
the point where [c, p] meets the boundary of G. We will
show that, for each s ∈ (q, p) there exists a qplex Qs such
that G ∪ [c, s] ⊆ Qs and (s, p] ∩ Qs = ∅. The result will
then follow since Qs 6= Qs′ if s 6= s′.
To construct the qplex Qs for given s ∈ (q, p) observe
that it follows from the basic theory of convex sets [28]
that there exists a hyperplane through s and not inter-
secting G. This means we can choose u ∈ H such that
〈u, v〉 < 〈u, s〉 = 1 (170)
for all v ∈ G. Observe that for all t ∈ (s, p) we have
t = λs+ (1− λ)c (171)
for some λ > 1 and, consequently,
〈u, t〉 = (d
2 − 1)λ+ 1
d2
> 1. (172)
Let
u′ =
(
1 +
1
(d+ 1)(d2 − 1)
)
c− 1
(d+ 1)(d2 − 1)u (173)
and let A = cc
(
G ∪ {s}). Then it is easily seen that
u′ ∈ A∗ while
〈u′, t〉 < 1
d(d+ 1)
(174)
for all t ∈ (s, p). A is a closed, convex germ containing S,
so it follows from Corollary 13 that there exists a qplex
Qs containing A and u
′. By construction t /∈ Qs for all
t ∈ (s, p), so Qs has the required properties.
The result just proved shows that there exist uncount-
ably many qplexes. However, we would like to know a
little more: namely, how many qplexes there are which
are geometrically distinct. We now prove a series of re-
sults leading to Theorem 18, which states that there are
uncountably many qplexes which are not isomorphic to
each other, or to quantum state space.
Definition 5. Let s ∈ H be arbitrary. We define the polar
point of s to be the point
s∗ = c− rori‖s− c‖2 (s− c) (175)
and the polar hyperplane of s to be the set
Hs =
{
u ∈ H : 〈u, s〉 = 1
d(d+ 1)
}
. (176)
Observe that s∗∗ = s for all s, and
〈s∗, s〉 = 1
d(d+ 1)
(177)
(so s∗ ∈ Hs). The relations between the polar {s}∗, the
polar point s∗ and the polar hyperplane Hs are depicted
in Fig. 4. It follows from these definitions that if s is any
c
ss*
Hs
FIG. 4: Diagram to illustrate the relationships between the
polar {s}∗, the polar point s∗ and the polar hyperplane Hs.
{s}∗ is the pink-shaded region to the right of Hs.
point on So (respectively Si), then s
∗ is on Si (respec-
tively So).
Theorem 15. Let G be a closed germ, and let s be any
point on So. Then s ∈ G if and only if s∗ is on the
boundary of G∗.
Remark. Specializing to the case when G is a qplex, the
theorem says that the points where the boundary of G
touches the out-sphere are antipodal to the points where
it touches the in-sphere. This is a subtle property of
quantum state space [52, 53].
Proof. Suppose s ∈ G. Then it follows that s∗ ∈ Si. The
fact that G is a germ means G ⊆ E, implying S ⊆ G∗.
So s∗ ∈ G∗. Moreover, if we define
tn =
n+ 1
n
s∗ − 1
n
c, (178)
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then
〈tn, s〉 = 1
d(d+ 1)
− 1
nd2(d+ 1)
<
1
d(d+ 1)
(179)
for all n. So tn is a sequence outside G
∗ converging to
s∗. We conclude that s∗ is on the boundary of G∗.
Conversely, suppose s∗ is on the boundary of G∗. Then
we can choose a sequence tn /∈ G∗ such that tn → s∗. For
each n there must exist pn ∈ G such that
〈tn, pn〉 < 1
d(d+ 1)
. (180)
Since G is closed and bounded it is compact. A theorem
of point set topology has it that in a compact set, every
sequence contains a convergent subsequence. Therefore,
we can choose a convergent subsequence pnj → p ∈ G.
Also, the fact that tnj → s∗ means t∗nj → s. So
‖p− s‖2 = lim
j
(
‖pnj − t∗nj‖2
)
. (181)
We can expand the quantity inside the limit as
‖pnj−t∗nj‖2 = ‖pnj−c‖2+‖t∗nj−c‖2−2
〈
t∗nj − c, pnj − c
〉
.
(182)
In turn, we have that
lim
j
(
‖pnj − t∗nj‖2
)
≤ ‖p− c‖2 − r2o. (183)
Because p is contained in the out-ball, its distance from
c has to be less than ro, meaning that
‖p− s‖2 ≤ ‖p− c‖2 − r2o ≤ 0. (184)
So p coincides with s, which consequently belongs to G.
We next prove two results which show that we can
restrict our attention to the out-sphere when trying to
establish the existence of non-isomorphic qplexes. The
first of these, Lemma 16, is a technical result which will
also be used in Section V.
Lemma 16. Let G be a closed germ containing S, and
let
C = G ∪ (G∗ ∩Bm) (185)
where Bm is the mid-ball. Then C is a closed germ such
that C ′ ∩ So = G ∩ So for every germ C ′ containing C.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3 and Lemma 6 that
C∗ = G∗ ∩ cc(G ∪Bm), (186)
from which one sees that C ⊆ C∗. Moreover, the fact
that S ⊆ G means G∗ ⊆ ∆ ∩ Bo, implying C ⊆ ∆ ∩ Bo.
So C is a closed germ containing G. Let C ′ be any germ
containing C. It is immediate that G ∩ So = C ∩ So ⊆
C ′∩So. Suppose, on the other hand, that s is a point on
So not belonging to G. Let G
∗
b, Cb be the boundaries of
G∗, C respectively. The fact that C ∩ Bm = G∗ ∩ Bm is
easily seen to imply G∗b∩Si = Cb∩Si. So it follows from
Theorem 15 that s∗ /∈ Cb. Since Si ⊆ C this means s∗
must lie in the interior of C. So there exists λ > 1 such
that
t = λs∗ + (1− λ)s (187)
is in C. Since
〈t, s〉 = 2− λ
d(d+ 1)
<
1
d(d+ 1)
, (188)
it follows that s /∈ C∗. Consequently s /∈ C ′.
Theorem 17. Let G be a closed germ containing the
vertices of the basis simplex. Then there exists a qplex Q
such that Q ∩ So = G ∩ So.
Proof. Let
G˜ = cc(G ∪∆e ∪Bi). (189)
Then G˜ is a closed germ containing S. Moreover G˜∩So =
G ∩ So. Let
C = G˜ ∪
(
G˜∗ ∩Bm
)
. (190)
Then it follows from Lemma 16 that C is a germ and
that Q ∩ So = G ∩ So for any qplex Q containing C.
Before proving Theorem 18 we need to give a sharp
definition of what it means for two qplexes to be isomor-
phic.
Definition 6. We say that two qplexes Q and Q′ are
isomorphic if and only if there exists a linear bijection
f : Rd2 → Rd2 such that
1. Q′ = f(Q).
2. For all q1, q2 ∈ Q
〈f(q1), f(q2)〉 = 〈q1, q2〉. (191)
We are now ready to prove the final result of this sec-
tion.
Theorem 18. There exist uncountably many qplexes
which are not isomorphic to each other.
Proof. We have
〈ei, ej〉 = dδij + d+ 2
d(d+ 1)2
(192)
for all i, j (c.f. Eq. (123)). So if we define
pθ = c+ cos θ(e1 − c) + sin θ(e2 − c) (193)
Gθ = {pθ, e1, . . . , ed2} (194)
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then, for sufficiently small , the set Gθ is a germ for
all θ ∈ (0, ). It follows from Theorem 17 that we can
choose qplexes Qθ such that Qθ ∩ So = Gθ ∩ So = Gθ.
By construction, the scalar products 〈pθ, ej〉 are different
for different choices of θ, and so qplexes Qθ corresponding
to different values of θ are non-isomorphic. Moreover, the
fact that the intersection with So is finite means that Qθ
is non-isomorphic to quantum state space for all θ.
So far we have been focussing on qplexes in general.
However, it seems to us that the method of analysis em-
ployed is a potentially insightful way of thinking about
the geometry of quantum state space.
IV. TYPE-PRESERVING MEASUREMENTS
We now come to the central result of this paper. We
will show that the symmetry group of a qplex can be
identified with a set of measurements, which in turn can
be identified with a set of regular simplices within the
qplex whose vertices all lie on the out-sphere.
Let Q be a qplex and r a measurement with n out-
comes. For each q ∈ Q, let qr be the distribution given
by the urgleichung, Eq. (11). Then the map q → qr takes
Q to
Qr = {qr : q ∈ Q} ⊆ ∆n (195)
(where ∆n is the n− 1 dimensional probability simplex).
We refer to Qr as the measurement set, and the map
q → qr as the measurement map.
We are interested in measurements having d2 outcomes
for which the measurement set is another qplex. We will
refer to such measurements as type-preserving. We are
particularly interested in the case when the measurement
set is Q itself, in which case we will say that the mea-
surement is Q-preserving.
Let r be an arbitrary measurement. Then it is easily
seen that the urgleichung can be written in the alterna-
tive form
qr(i) =
∑
j
Rijq(j), (196)
where
Rij = (d+ 1)r(i|j)− 1
d
∑
k
r(i|k). (197)
We refer to R as the stretched measurement matrix. Note
that Eq. (197) can be inverted:
r(i|j) = 1
d+ 1
(
Rij +
1
d
∑
k
Rik
)
. (198)
So the stretched measurement matrix uniquely specifies
the measurement.
Now specialize to the case of a type-preserving mea-
surement. In that case it turns out that R must be an
orthogonal matrix. To see this we begin by observing
that, since the basis simplex belongs to both Q and Qr,
there must exist si ∈ Q, s′i ∈ Qr such that
Rsi = ei, Rei = s
′
i. (199)
We then have
Lemma 19. Let R, si, s
′
i be as above. Then
1. detR = ±1.
2. si, s
′
i ∈ So for all i.
3. cc({si}) and cc({s′i}) are regular simplices.
Proof. The proof is based on the fact [45] that the sim-
plices of maximal volume within a ball are precisely the
regular simplices with vertices on the sphere that bounds
the ball. The desired result follows from considering the
simplex formed by the si and the origin (and the corre-
sponding simplex formed by the s′i and the origin).
To complete the proof that R is an orthogonal matrix,
we observe that maps from regular simplices to regular
simplices are orthogonal. From this, we can derive the
following theorem.
Theorem 20. Let Q be a qplex, and let R be the
stretched measurement matrix of a type-preserving mea-
surement. Then R is an orthogonal matrix such that
Rc = c. Moreover there exists a regular simplex with
vertices si ∈ Q ∩ So such that
Rij = (d+ 1)si(j)− 1
d
, (200)
Rsi = ei, (201)
(Rei)(j) = sj(i). (202)
Remark. We will refer to cc({si}) as the measurement
simplex.
For a given qplex Q define
1. TQ to be the class of type-preserving measurements.
2. SQ to be the class of regular simplices with vertices
in Q ∩ So.
3. OQ to be the class of orthogonal matrices R such
that RQ is a qplex.
The previous theorem states that to each element of TQ
there corresponds an element of SQ and an element of
OQ. The next theorem we prove states that the corre-
spondences are in fact bijective, so that we can identify
the three classes TQ, SQ and OQ.
Theorem 21. Let Q be a qplex and let si ∈ Q ∩ So
be the vertices of a regular simplex ∆s. Then ∆s is the
measurement simplex of a type-preserving measurement.
Likewise, if R is an orthogonal matrix such that RQ is
also a qplex, then R is the stretched measurement matrix
for a type-preserving measurement.
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Proof. Define
r(i|j) = si(j). (203)
It is immediate that the r(i|j) are the conditional proba-
bilities defining a measurement with stretched measure-
ment matrix
Rij = (d+ 1)si(j)− 1
d
. (204)
We need to show that the measurement is type-
preserving. In other words, we need to show that the
set RQ is a qplex. For all q ∈ Q
(Rq)(i) = (d+ 1)〈si, q〉 − 1
d
, (205)
from which it follows
(Rq)(i) ≥ 0
∑
i
(Rq)(i) = 1. (206)
So RQ ⊆ ∆. Also, it follows from the same considera-
tions that led to Theorem 20 that R is orthogonal. The
defining condition of a germ, Eq. (116), is invariant under
orthogonal transformations. Therefore, RQ is a qplex.
We now prove the other direction of the correspon-
dence. Let R be an orthogonal matrix such that RQ is
a qplex. We know that the basis distributions ei must
belong to RQ. So, there exist si ∈ Q such that
ei = Rsi. (207)
Since detR = ±1 we have, by the same argument used
to prove Lemma 19, that the si ∈ So and are the vertices
of a regular simplex. It now follows from the considera-
tions above that cc({si}) is the measurement simplex of
a type-preserving measurement, with stretched measure-
ment matrix
R′ij = (d+ 1)si(j)−
1
d
. (208)
By multiplying both sides of Eq. (207) by RT, we find
that
si(j) =
∑
k
RTjkei(k)
=
1
d+ 1
Rij +
1
d(d+ 1)
∑
k
Rkj . (209)
Summing over i on both sides of this equation we find∑
k Rkj = 1 for all j and, consequently, R = R
′.
At this stage, we recall our definition of an isomor-
phism between qplexes: Two qplexes Q and Q′ are iso-
morphic if and only if there exists an inner-product-
preserving map f : Rd2 → Rd2 that sends Q to Q′.
Theorem 22. Let Q, Q′ be qplexes. Then Q and Q′
are isomorphic if and only if there is a type-preserving
measurement on Q such that Q′ = RQ, where R is the
stretched measurement matrix.
Proof. Sufficiency is immediate. To prove necessity sup-
pose that f : Q→ Q′ is an isomorphism. The fact that f
preserves scalar products on a set which spans Rd2 means
that it must be represented by an orthogonal matrix. The
claim now follows from Theorem 21.
So far we have been looking at type-preserving mea-
surements in general. Let us now focus on the special
case of Q-preserving measurements. Suppose that we
have two such measurements, with measurement matri-
ces R, R′. Then RR′ is also an orthogonal matrix, with
the property that RR′Q = Q. So it follows from The-
orem 21 that RR′ is the stretched measurement matrix
for a Q-preserving measurement. Similarly with RT, the
inverse. In short, the Q-preserving measurement maps
form a group. For ease of reference let us give it a name:
Definition 7. Let Q be a qplex. The preservation group
of Q, denoted GQ, is the group of type-preserving mea-
surement maps between Q and itself.
The elements of GQ are symmetries of Q. The ques-
tion naturally arises, whether they comprise all the sym-
metries. The above considerations are not sufficient to
answer that question because they leave open the possi-
bility that Q is invariant under orthogonal transforma-
tions which do not fix the origin of Rd2 . The following
theorem eliminates that possibility.
Theorem 23. Let Q be a qplex. Then the preservation
group is the symmetry group of Q.
Proof. The symmetry group of a subset of a normed vec-
tor space is defined to be the group of isometries of the
set. It has been shown above that every Q-preserving
measurement map is an isometry of Q. We need to show
the converse. Let f be an isometry of Q. It follows from
Theorem 20 that f(c) = c.
Now define a map f˜ : Q− c→ Q− c by
f˜(u) = f(u+ c)− c (210)
One easily sees that ‖f˜(u)‖ = ‖u‖ for all u ∈ Q − c.
Consequently
f˜(u) = Tu (211)
for some orthogonal transformation T of the subspace
H−c. We may extend T to an orthogonal transformation
R of the whole space Rd2 by defining Rc = c. It is then
immediate that RQ = Q. The result now follows by
Theorem 21.
V. FROM PRESERVATION GROUP TO QPLEX
In this section we ask what conditions a subgroup of
O(d2) must satisfy in order to be the preservation group
of some qplex. This will lead us to the question of when
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symmetries are powerful enough to determine a qplex es-
sentially uniquely. LetQ be a qplex and G be its preserva-
tion group. Under what conditions can Q be maximally
symmetric, in the sense that G is not a proper subgroup
of the symmetry group of any qplex? The answer will
turn out to depend upon how the group G acts on the
basis simplex.
Quantum state space has the property that any pure
state can be mapped to any other pure state by some uni-
tary operation, that is, by some symmetry of the state
space. Indeed, given any pure state, the set of all pure
states is the orbit of the original state under the action
of the symmetry group. This leads us to consider the
general question of qplexes whose extremal points form
a single orbit under the action of the qplex’s symmetries.
One can prove that if Q is such a qplex, then the symme-
try group of Q is maximal, and furthermore, any other
qplex Q′ with the same symmetry group is identical to Q.
Given a group G ⊆ O(d2), can G be the preservation
group of a qplex? It is easy to find a necessary condi-
tion. Following our previous paper [21], we introduce the
concept of a stochastic subgroup:
Definition 8. A subgroup G ⊆ O(d2) is stochastic if, for
all R ∈ G,
Rij ≥ −1
d
∀i, j and Rc = c. (212)
Equivalently, we may say that a subgroup G ⊆ O(d2)
is stochastic if every matrix in G is of the form
Rij = (d+ 1)Sij − 1
d
, (213)
where Sij = si(j) is a doubly-stochastic matrix (hence
the name). It can then be seen from Theorem 20 that ev-
ery preservation group is a stochastic subgroup of O(d2).
It is natural to ask whether the condition is sufficient
as well as necessary, so that every stochastic subgroup of
O(d2) is the preservation group of some qplex. We have
not been able to answer this question in full generality.
However, we have obtained some partial results. We can
show that any stochastic subgroup G ⊆ O(d2) is at least
contained in the preservation group of some qplex. To
see why, we start with a preliminary result.
Lemma 24. Let G be a stochastic subgroup of O(d2).
For each R ∈ G define the vectors sRi by applying R to
the basis distributions:
sRi (j) =
1
d(d+ 1)
(dRij + 1) . (214)
Then sRi ∈ ∆ ∩ So for all i and cc({sRi }) is a regular
simplex. Moreover
G = {sRi : R ∈ G, i = 1, . . . , d2} (215)
is a germ.
Proof. Straightforward consequence of the definitions.
Definition 9. Let G be a stochastic subgroup of O(d2).
The orbital germ is the orbit of the basis distributions
under the action of G, that is, the set G specified in the
statement of Lemma 24.
Theorem 25. Let G be a stochastic subgroup of O(d2).
Then there exists a qplex Q such that G ⊆ GQ.
Proof. Let G be the orbital germ of G, and let AG be the
set of all germs P such that
1. P contains G.
2. RP = P for all R ∈ G.
It follows from Zorn’s lemma that AG contains at least
one maximal element. Let Q be such a maximal element.
Observe that if P is in AG then its convex closure is
also in AG; consequently Q must be convex and closed.
Observe, also, that if R is any element of G, then c is in
the interior of the simplex cc({sRi }); consequently c is in
the interior of Q.
We claim that Q is in fact a qplex. For suppose it
were not. Then we could choose p ∈ ∆ ∩ Bo ∩ Q∗ such
that p /∈ Q. For each λ in the closed interval [0, 1] define
pλ = λp + (1 − λ)c. The fact that Q is closed, convex
together with the fact that c is in the interior of Q means
that there exists λ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that pλ ∈ Q if and only
if λ ∈ [0, λ0]. We have
〈p,Rpλ〉 ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
(216)
for all R ∈ G, λ ∈ [0, λ0]. Consequently
〈pλ, Rpλ〉 ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
+
1− λ
d2(d+ 1)
(217)
for all λ ∈ [0, λ0], R ∈ G. By continuity this inequality
must hold for all λ ∈ [0, λ0], R ∈ G¯, where G¯ is the
closure of G in O(d2). It follows that there must exist a
fixed number µ ∈ (λ0, 1] such that
〈pµ, Rpµ〉 ≥ 1
d(d+ 1)
(218)
for all R ∈ G. For suppose that were not the case. Then
we could choose a sequence νn ↓ λ0, and a sequence Rn ∈
G, such that
〈pνn , Rnpνn〉 <
1
d(d+ 1)
(219)
for all n. The group G¯ is compact (because O(d2) is
compact [46]) as is the closed interval
[
0, 1d(d+1)
]
. Con-
sequently we can choose a subsequence nj such that
Rnj → R¯ ∈ G¯ and
〈pνnj , Rnjpνnj 〉 → a (220)
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for some a ∈
[
0, 1d(d+1)
]
. But this would imply that
〈pλ0 , R¯pλ0〉 = a ≤
1
d(d+ 1)
(221)
—which is a contradiction.
Now consider the set
Q′ = Q ∪ {Rpµ : R ∈ G}. (222)
Observe that
(Rpµ)(i) = (d+ 1)〈sRi , pµ〉 −
1
d
≥ 0 (223)
for all i and all R ∈ G (because pµ ∈ Q∗ ⊆ G∗). So
Q′ ⊆ ∆. It is immediate that Q′ ⊆ Bo and Q′ ⊆ Q′∗.
So Q′ is a germ such that RQ′ = Q′ for all R ∈ G, and
which is strictly larger than Q—which is a contradiction.
It is now immediate that G is a subgroup of GQ.
We can make stronger statements if we introduce some
new concepts.
Definition 10. A stochastic subgroup G ⊆ O(d2) is max-
imal if it is not contained in any larger stochastic sub-
group.
Definition 11. A stochastic subgroup G ⊆ O(d2) is
strongly maximal if it is maximal and if, in addition,
the closed convex hull of the orbital germ is a qplex.
We then have the following results.
Corollary 26. Let G be a maximal stochastic subgroup
of O(d2). Then there exists a qplex Q such that G = GQ.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 25.
Theorem 27. Let G be a strongly maximal stochastic
subgroup of O(d2) and let G be the orbital germ. Then
cc(G) is the unique qplex Q such that G = GQ.
Proof. We know from Corollary 26 that there exists at
least one qplex Q such that G = GQ. If Q, Q′ are qplexes
such that G = GQ = GQ′ then Q, Q′ must both contain
cc(G), where G is the orbital germ. Since cc(G) is a qplex
we must have Q = cc(G) = Q′.
This brings us back to the claim we made at the be-
ginning of this section.
Corollary 28. If Q is a qplex whose extreme points form
a single orbit under the action of the preservation group,
then the preservation group of Q is strongly maximal.
Proof. Let Q be a qplex and G be its preservation group.
Assume that the extremal points form a single orbit un-
der the action of G. The basis distributions are among
the extremal points, so all extremal points are on the
same orbit as any basis distribution. In other words, the
orbital germ is the set of extreme points. Suppose that
Q′ is a qplex whose preservation group contains G. Then
Q′ contains all the extremal points of Q, and thus, Q′
contains Q. But a qplex is a maximal germ, so we must
have Q′ = Q.
VI. CHARACTERIZING QPLEXES
ISOMORPHIC TO QUANTUM STATE SPACE
We are, of course, most interested in qplexes corre-
sponding to SIC measurements. In this section, we will
define what it means for a qplex to be isomorphic to
quantum state space. We will prove that if Q is a qplex
isomorphic to quantum state space, then its preservation
group is isomorphic to the projective extended unitary
group, essentially the group of all unitaries and anti-
unitaries with phase factors quotiented out. Then, we
will establish the converse: If the preservation group of
a qplex is isomorphic to the projective extended unitary
group, then that qplex is isomorphic to quantum state
space. This result indicates one way of recovering quan-
tum theory from the urgleichung.
Definition 12. Let BH be the space of Hermitian oper-
ators on d-dimensional Hilbert space and let S be the
space of density matrices. We will say that a qplex Q
is isomorphic to quantum state space if there exists an
R-linear bijection f : BH → Rd2 such that
1. Q = f(S).
2. For all ρ, ρ′ ∈ S
〈
f(ρ), f(ρ′)
〉
=
tr(ρρ′) + 1
d(d+ 1)
. (224)
A qplex that is isomorphic to quantum state space will
be designated a Hilbert qplex.
It is straightforward to verify that definitions 6 and 12
are consistent, in the sense that if Q is a Hilbert qplex,
and if Q′ is any other qplex, then Q′ is a Hilbert qplex
if and only if it is isomorphic to Q in the sense of defini-
tion 6.
Theorem 29. Let Q be a qplex. Then a map f : S → Q
is an isomorphism of quantum state space onto Q if and
only if there is a SIC Πj such that
(f(ρ))(j) =
1
d
tr(ρΠj) (225)
for all j and all ρ ∈ S.
Remark. Thus, to each isomorphism of quantum state
space onto Q, there corresponds a unique SIC. In partic-
ular a SIC exists in dimension d if and only if a Hilbert
qplex exists in dimension d.
Proof. Suppose f : S → Q is an isomorphism. Define
Πj = f
−1(ej). (226)
Then
tr(ΠjΠk) = d(d+ 1)〈ej , ek〉 − 1 = dδjk + 1
d+ 1
. (227)
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So Πj is a SIC. Moreover, for all ρ ∈ S, and all j,
1
d
tr(ρΠj) = (d+ 1)〈f(ρ), ej〉 − 1
d
= (f(ρ))(j). (228)
Suppose, on the other hand, f : S → Q is a map for
which Eq. (225) is satisfied for some SIC Πj . Then we
can extend f to a linear bijection of BH onto Rd
2
. We
know from prior work [1, 2, 19] that f(S) is a qplex. Since
it is contained in Q we must have f(S) = Q. Moreover,
since
ρ =
∑
j
(
(d+ 1)(f(ρ))(j)− 1
d
)
Πj , (229)
with a similar expression for ρ′, we have
tr(ρρ′) = d(d+ 1)〈f(ρ), f(ρ′)〉 − 1 (230)
from which Eq. (224) follows.
One might wonder if other qplexes, not isomorphic to
Q (and we know that these exist, per Theorem 18 and
Appendix A), correspond to other informationally com-
plete POVMs. This is not the case. It follows from the
foregoing that there is no measurement which will take
us from a qplex of one kind to a qplex of a different,
nonisomorphic kind.
Knowing this, let us characterize the preservation
group of a Hilbert qplex Q. We define the extended uni-
tary group, denoted EU(d), to be the group consisting
of all unitary and anti-unitary operators, and the pro-
jective extended unitary group, denoted PEU(d), to be
the quotient EU(d)/M(d), where M(d) is the sub-group
consisting of all unitaries of the form eiθI, for some phase
eiθ.
Theorem 30. Let Q be a Hilbert qplex. Then GQ is
isomorphic to PEU(d).
Proof. Straightforward consequence of Wigner’s theo-
rem [47].
We showed in Theorem 30 that if Q is a Hilbert qplex
then GQ is isomorphic to PEU(d). Now, we will prove
the converse: If GQ is isomorphic to PEU(d), then Q
is a Hilbert qplex. It turns out, in fact, that a weaker
statement is true: If GQ contains a subgroup isomorphic
to PU(d), then Q is a Hilbert qplex.
In the Introduction we remarked on the need for an
extra assumption, additional to the basic definition of a
qplex, which will serve to uniquely pick out those qplexes
which correspond to quantum state space. The theorem
we will prove momentarily supplies us with one possi-
ble choice for this assumption. As we remarked in the
introduction, there may be others.
As a by-product of this result we obtain a criterion for
SIC existence: Namely, a SIC exists in dimension d if
and only if PU(d) is isomorphic to a stochastic subgroup
of O(d2). We proved this result by another method in
a previous paper [21], but this is the route by which we
were originally led to it. Indeed, it is hard to see why
it should occur to anyone that stochastic subgroups of
O(d2) might be relevant to SIC existence if they were
not aware of the role that such subgroups play in the
theory of qplexes.
The result depends on the following method for embed-
ding a qplex in operator space. The question of whether
a SIC exists in every dimension is very hard, and, in-
deed, is still unsolved. But if one simply asks for a set of
operators Π1, . . . ,Πd2 satisfying the equations
tr(Πj) = 1, (231)
tr(ΠjΠk) =
dδjk + 1
d+ 1
, (232)
without imposing any further constraint—in particular,
without requiring that the Πj be positive semi-definite—
then the problem becomes almost trivial. To see this
consider the real Lie algebra su(d) (i.e. the space of trace-
zero Hermitian operators). Equipped with the Hilbert–
Schmidt inner product
〈B,B′〉 = tr(BB′), (233)
this becomes a (d2−1)-Euclidean space, so the existence
of operators B1, . . . , Bd2 , each of length 1, and forming
the vertices of a regular simplex, is guaranteed. These
operators satisfy
tr(BjBk) =
{
1 j = k;
− 1d2−1 j 6= k.
(234)
If we now define
Πj =
√
d− 1
d
Bj +
1
d
I, (235)
then the Πj satisfy Eqs. (231) and (232). We will refer
to them as a quasi-SIC.
Now let Q be an arbitrary qplex, and for each q ∈ Q
define, by analogy with Eq. (3)
ρq =
∑
j
(
(d+ 1)q(j)− 1
d
)
Πj . (236)
If Πj really were a SIC, and if the q(j) really were the
outcome probabilities for a measurement with that SIC,
then ρq would be a density matrix. In general, however,
neither of those conditions need hold true. So, ρq will
typically not be positive semi-definite (though it will be
trace-1). We will refer to it as a quasi-density matrix. It
will also be convenient to define
SQ = {ρq : q ∈ Q}. (237)
We will refer to SQ as quasi-state space. It is easily
verified that
0 ≤ 〈ρ, ρ′〉 ≤ 1, (238)
for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ SQ, just as is the case for genuine density
matrices.
We are now in a position to prove
23
Theorem 31. Let Q be a qplex. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
1. GQ contains a subgroup isomorphic to PU(d).
2. Q is a Hilbert qplex.
Proof. The implication (2) =⇒ (1) is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 30. It remains to prove the im-
plication (1) =⇒ (2).
Let Πj be a quasi-SIC, and use this quasi-SIC to map
the qplex Q into operator space, creating the quasi-state
space SQ. The fact that the qplex Q contains a subgroup
isomorphic to the projective unitary group PU(d) implies
that the quasi-state space SQ is invariant under unitary
transformations. That is, the projective unitary symme-
try of one set carries over to the other. This result is
fairly natural; for completeness, we provide an explicit
proof in Appendix B.
Suppose q ∈ Q ∈ So. Then
tr(ρq) = tr(ρ
2
q) = 1. (239)
Also, it follows from Eq. (238) and unitary invariance of
the quasi-state space that
0 ≤ tr(ρqUρqU†) ≤ 1. (240)
for every unitary U . By choosing U to give the appro-
priate permutation of the eigenvalues we deduce that
0 ≤
∑
i
λ↑i λ
↓
i ≤ 1, (241)
where λ↑i (respectively λ
↓
i ) are the eigenvalues of ρq ar-
ranged in increasing (respectively decreasing) order.
We now invoke a lemma proven in [21]. If λ is a vector
in Rd such that
d−1∑
j=0
λj =
d−1∑
j=0
λ2j = 1, (242)
then 〈
λ↑, λ↓
〉 ≤ 0. (243)
The inequality is saturated if and only if d− 1 entries in
λ are equal. This can occur when
λ↓ = (1, 0, . . . , 0), (244)
or when
λ↓ =
(
2
d
, . . . ,
2
d
,
2
d
− 1
)
. (245)
So we must have ∑
i
λ↑i λ
↓
i = 0. (246)
Moreover, the possible solutions for the eigenvalue spec-
trum λ↓ imply that either ρq = P or ρq = (2/d)I − P
for some rank-1 projector P . If d = 2, then ρq is a rank-
1 projector either way. Otherwise, if d > 2, suppose q,
q′ ∈ Q ∈ So were such that ρq = P and ρq′ = (2/d)I−P ′
where P and P ′ are rank-1 projectors. In that case there
would be a unitary U such that UP ′U† = P , which would
mean, by unitary invariance, that the quasi-state space
contained both P and (2/d)I − P . But
tr
(
P
(
2
d
I − P
))
=
2
d
− 1 < 1, (247)
which contradicts Eq. (238). We conclude that if d > 2
then, either ρq is a rank-1 projector for all q ∈ Q, or else
(2/d)I − ρq is a rank-1 projector for all q ∈ Q. In the
latter case we may define a new quasi-SIC
Π˜′j =
2
d
I − Π˜j . (248)
One easily verifies that the new quasi-state space is also
unitarily invariant. Moreover, if we define
ρ′q =
∑
j
(
(d+ 1)q(j)− 1
d
)
Π˜′j , (249)
then
ρ′q =
2
d
I − ρq, (250)
implying that ρ′q is a rank-1 projector for all q ∈ Q ∈ So.
There is therefore no loss of generality in assuming that
our original quasi-state space is such that ρq is a rank-1
projector for all q ∈ Q ∈ So. Since
ρei = Π˜i, (251)
this means in particular that the Πi are rank-1 projectors,
and therefore constitute a genuine SIC.
Let us note that unitary invariance means that the set
{ρq : q ∈ Q ∈ So} does not merely consist of rank-1 pro-
jectors; it actually comprises all the rank-1 projectors.
It follows, that if ρ is an arbitrary density matrix, and
if q(j) = (1/d) tr(ρΠ˜j), then q is a convex combination
of points in Q ∈ So, and therefore q ∈ Q. Since the
SIC probabilities are a qplex, it follows that Q does not
contain any other points than these, and is therefore iso-
morphic to quantum state space as claimed.
Let us observe that in proving this theorem we have
incidentally shown that if there is a qplex Q which con-
tains an isomorphic copy of PU(d), then a SIC exists in
dimension d. So the theorem has the following corollary:
Corollary 32. The following statements are equivalent:
1. PU(d) is isomorphic to a stochastic subgroup of
O(d2).
2. A SIC exists in dimension d.
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Proof. The implication (2) =⇒ (1) is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 31. To prove the implication
(1) =⇒ (2), let G be a stochastic subgroup of O(d2)
which is isomorphic to PU(d). It follows from Theo-
rem 25 that there exists a qplex Q such that G ⊆ GQ.
In view of Theorem 31 this implies Q is the set of out-
come probabilities for a SIC measurement, which means,
in particular, that a SIC must exist in dimension d.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our investigation of qplexes exists in the context of
many years’ effort toward the goal of reconstructing
quantum theory. Early pioneers of the subject, like
Birkhoff and von Neumann, sought a broader mathemat-
ical environment in which quantum theory could be seen
to dwell. This led to the subjects of quantum logic and
Jordan algebras [51]. However, despite the mathemati-
cal developments, the influence on physics—and, indeed,
on the philosophy thereof—was rather subdued. The in-
stensely mathematical character of the work may have
played a role in this. Moreover, this work predated the
invention and integration into physics of information the-
ory, which turned out to be a boon to the reconstruction
enterprise. It also predated the theorems of Bell, Kochen
and Specker [54, 55], and thus it could not benefit from
their insight into what is robustly strange about quantum
physics.
One might say that the “modern age” of quantum re-
constructions was inaugurated by Rovelli in 1996. He
advocated a research program of deriving quantum the-
ory from physical principles, in a manner analogous to
the derivation of special relativity’s mathematical for-
malism [48]. During the same time period, one of the au-
thors (CAF) also began advocating this project [4, 5, 32].
An early success was Hardy’s “Quantum theory from five
reasonable axioms” [36, 37], which pointed out the im-
portance of what we call a Bureau of Standards measure-
ment [9, p. 368].
Looking over the papers produced in this “modern
age,” one technical commonality worth remarking upon
is the idea of building up the unitary (or projective uni-
tary) group from a universal gate set [34, 35]. This is an
idea from the field of quantum computation. For exam-
ple, it is known that any unitary operator can be broken
down into a sequence of two-level unitaries, applied in
succession [49, p. 188]. Also, given a collection of N
qubits, all the projective unitaries acting on their joint
state space—that is, the group PU(2N )—can be synthe-
sized using single-qubit unitaries and an entangling gate,
like a Controlled not operation, that can be applied to
any pair of qubits [50]. This suggests one way of mak-
ing progress in the theory of qplexes, by replacing the
unitarity assumption.
Recall that in any qplex, a set of mutually maximally
distant points can have at most d elements [19, 32]. Thus,
although a qplex is originally defined as living within
a d2-dimensional space, in a sense it has an “underly-
ing dimensionality” [32] equal to d. Consider a qplex
Q, equipped with a set of d mutually maximally distant
pure states. What if we require that any d − 1 of those
states defines a structure isomorphic to a smaller qplex?
Applying this recursively, we arrive eventually at the con-
dition that any two maximally distant points define a set
of probability distributions isomorphic to a qplex with
d = 2, which is automatically a Hilbert qplex. This is a
strong condition, although it makes no direct mention of
a particular symmetry group. At the moment, we see no
way to satisfy this condition other than having Q be a
Hilbert qplex.
Alternatively, one can try to make progress by relax-
ing the unitarity assumption. For example, instead of
imposing a particular symmetry group, what if we seek
the qplexes of maximal allowed symmetry? Assuming
that a SIC exists in dimension d, then a qplex in ∆d2
can be at least as symmetric as a Hilbert qplex. We
conjecture that no qplex can be more symmetric than a
Hilbert qplex, where we quantify the degree of symmetry
by, for example, the dimension of the Lie group of qplex-
preserving maps. This conjecture leads to another: We
suspect that of all the qplexes of a given dimension, the
Hilbert qplexes have maximal Euclidean volume.
Another outstanding question is, out of all the con-
ceivable additions one could make to probability theory
in order to relate expectations for different hypotheticals,
why pick the urgleichung? To our knowledge, no one con-
sidered such a relation before quantum mechanics and the
SIC representation. And yet, it is a comparatively mild
modification of the classical relationship. This is partic-
ularly evident when the measurement on the ground is
modeled by a set of d orthogonal projectors, i.e., when
it is a von Neumann measurement. In that case,
q(j) = (d+ 1)
∑
i
p(i)r(j|i)− 1. (252)
This is just a rescaling and shifting of the classical for-
mula [32].
In Section II, we began with a general affine relation-
ship between Bureau of Standards probabilities and the
probabilities for other experiments. By invoking a se-
ries of assumptions, we narrowed the parameter values
in the generalized urgleichung down to those that occur
in quantum theory. (Our last assumption, which fixed
the upper bound at twice the lower bound, may be re-
lated to the choice of complex numbers over real numbers
and quaternions for Hilbert-space coordinates [2]. For
an unexpected connection between SICs and the normed
division algebras, see [56, 57].) This has the appealing
feature that a linear stretching is just about the simplest
deformation of the classical Law of Total Probability that
one can imagine. However, this area is still, to a great
extent, unknown territory: Why linearity? Are quali-
tatively greater departures from classicality mathemati-
cally possible?
Many of the quantum reconstruction efforts to date
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share the feature that they make quantum physics as un-
remarkable as possible: While the technical steps from
axioms to theorems are unassailable, the choice of ax-
ioms gives little insight into what is truly strange about
quantum phenomena. To borrow a phrase from David
Mermin, these re-expressions tend to make quantum the-
ory sound “benignly humdrum” [58].
For example, should one aim to derive quantum theory
from the fact that quantum states cannot be cloned? Ar-
guably not: Even classical distributions over phase space
are uncloneable [59]. What about quantum teleporta-
tion? At root, teleportation is a protocol for making in-
formation about one system instead relevant to another,
and it has exact analogues in classical statistical theo-
ries [60–62]. In 2003, Clifton, Bub and Halvorson [63]
proposed a derivation of quantum theory that started
with C∗ algebras and then added, as postulates, some
results of quantum information science, such as the no-
broadcasting theorem [64]. However, the no-broadcasting
theorem—despite its original motivation [9, p. 2235]—
also applies in classical statistical theories [60–62], and
thus seems a poor foundation to build the quantum upon.
Overall, it seems that choosing C∗ algebras for a starting
point implicitly does a great deal of the work already [9,
p. 1125].
Similarly, a more recent derivation by Chiribella,
D’Ariano and Perinotti [65] invokes, at a key juncture,
the postulate that any mixed state can be treated as a
marginal of a pure state ascribed to a larger system. This
postulate, the purifiability of mixed states, is an essential
ingredient in their recovery of quantum theory. As with
the examples above, however, it is also true in classical
statistical theories [60–62, 66]. From that perspective, it
is consequently a less than fully compelling candidate for
the essence of quantumness.
By contrast, we have chosen as our starting point
what we consider to be the “jugular vein” of quantum
strangeness: Theories of intrinsic hidden variables do
so remarkably badly at expressing the vitality of quan-
tum physics. The urgleichung is our way of stating this
physical characteristic of the natural world in the lan-
guage of probability. Quantum states, it avers, are cata-
logues of expectations—but not expectations about hid-
den variables. This view is in line with “participatory
realist” interpretations of quantum mechanics [67, 68],
like QBism [1, 3, 69] and related approaches [70–72].
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Appendix A: A qplex which does not correspond to
a SIC measurement
By definition, a qplex is a subset of the probability
simplex ∆d2 such that each pair of points within it satisfy
the fundamental inequalities,
1
d(d+ 1)
≤
∑
i
p(i)s(i) ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (A1)
We can construct a qplex which is not isomorphic to
quantum state space in the following way. Begin with a
set A defined by the intersection of the probability sim-
plex with the ball∑
i
p(i)2 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
. (A2)
Our plan is to trim this set down until it becomes a qplex.
First, we break A into d2! regions, which we label Fk,
for k = 1, . . . , d2!. We define the region F1 to be all
probability vectors in the set A whose entries appear in
decreasing magnitude. That is,
F1 =
{
p : p ∈ A and p(1) ≥ p(2) ≥ · · · ≥ p(d2)} . (A3)
The region F1 is consistent with the fundamental inequal-
ities, because for every p ∈ F1,
〈p, p〉 ≥ 〈p, c〉 ≥ 1
d2
>
1
d(d+ 1)
. (A4)
We define the other regions Fk analogously. Because k
runs from 1 to (d2)!, it labels the permutations in the
symmetric group on d2 elements. Each Fk consists of the
vectors obtained by taking the vectors in F1 and permut-
ing the components according to permutation k. All of
the regions Fk so defined will be internally consistent.
To obtain a qplex Q, start with F1 and include all the
points from F1 in Q. Then, take all the points from F2
that are consistent with all the points in F1, and include
them in Q. Continue in this manner, adding the points
in each Fk that are consistent with every point added to
Q so far. The end result will be a qplex that is surely
not isomorphic to quantum state space.
Appendix B: Unitary Symmetry of Quasi-State
Spaces
Let Πj be a quasi-SIC, as defined in Eqs. (231) and
(232) of the main text. For each U ∈ PU(d) we have a
matrix SUjk such that
UΠjU
† =
∑
k
SUjkΠk. (B1)
The matrix is given explicitly by
SUjk =
d+ 1
d
tr
(
ΠkUΠjU
†)− 1
d
, (B2)
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from which one sees∑
j
SUjk = 1,
∑
k
SUjk = 1, (B3)
and∑
k
SUikS
U
jk =
d+ 1
d
tr
((∑
k
SUikΠk
)
UΠjU
†
)
− 1
d
= δij . (B4)
So SUij is an orthogonal matrix.
We now appeal to the assumption that GQ contains a
subgroup isomorphic to PU(d). So for each U ∈ PU(d)
there exists an orthogonal matrix RUjk ∈ GQ. It can be
proven that, up to equivalence, the adjoint representation
of PU(d) is the only nontrivial irreducible representation
of PU(d) having degree d2−1 or smaller, when d ≥ 2 [21].
Thus, the two representations here must be equivalent,
so that
RU = TSUT−1 (B5)
for all U and some fixed orthogonal matrix T . Summing
over k on both sides of∑
j
RUijTjk =
∑
j
TijS
U
jk (B6)
and appealing to the fact that the representations are
irreducible on the subspace orthogonal to c we deduce
that ∑
j
Tij = t (B7)
for some constant t, independent of i. Similarly∑
i
Tij = s (B8)
for some constant s, independent of i. Since
d2t =
∑
ij
Tij = d
2s, (B9)
we must in fact have s = t. Multiplying both sides of∑
j
Tij = t (B10)
by Tik and summing over i we find
1 = t
∑
i
Tik = t
2. (B11)
So t2 = ±1. If t = −1 we can make the replacement
T → −T without changing Eq. (B5). We may therefore
assume, without loss of generality,∑
j
Tij =
∑
j
Tji = 1 (B12)
for all i. It follows that, if we define
Π˜i =
∑
j
TijΠj , (B13)
then the Π˜i are also a quasi-SIC. Moreover
UΠ˜iU
† =
∑
j,k
TijS
U
jkT
T
klΠ˜l
=
∑
l
RUil Π˜l. (B14)
Suppose we now use the Π˜i to map Q into operator space
by defining
ρq =
∑
j
(
(d+ 1)q(j)− 1
d
)
Π˜j (B15)
for all q ∈ Q. It follows from the foregoing that, for all
q ∈ Q
UρqU
† = ρq′ , (B16)
where
q′(j) =
∑
k
RUkjq(k) (B17)
is also in Q. It follows that the quasi-state space {ρq : q ∈
Q} is invariant under unitary transformations.
Appendix C: An Alternate Route to the
Fundamental Inequalities
In the main text, we began with the urgleichung and
eventually arrived at the fundamental inequalities
1
d(d+ 1)
≤ 〈p, s〉 ≤ 2
d(d+ 1)
, (C1)
proving in Theorem 10 that a self-polar subset of the out-
ball Bo is a maximal germ. Because Theorem 10 is an
if-and-only-if result, it is natural to wonder if one could
argue for the fundamental inequalities from a different
premise, in which case self-polarity would be a conse-
quence of assuming maximality.
One counterintuitive feature of quantum theory is that
two quantum states can be perfectly distinguishable by a
von Neumann measurement, yet less distinguishable by
an informationally complete measurement [57, 73, 74].
This runs counter to experience with classical probabil-
ity and stochastic processes, which leads one to think of a
non-IC measurement as a coarse-graining (or a convolu-
tion by some kernel) of an IC measurement. If hypothesis
A is that the system is in region A of phase space, and
hypothesis B is that the system is in region B, classical
intuition says that hypothesis A and B being perfectly
distinguishable means that their regions have no overlap.
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Therefore, if we measure where the system is in phase
space—the fundamental classical image of what an IC
experiment can be—then some outcomes would be con-
sistent with hypothesis A, some with hypothesis B, and
none with both.
In quantum physics, two pure states being orthogo-
nal means that the overlap of their SIC representations
is minimal, but minimal is not zero. If we regard two
orthogonal states |0〉 and |1〉 as two hypotheses that Al-
ice can entertain about how a system will behave, then
there exists some measurement with the property that
no outcome is compatible with both hypotheses. What-
ever the outcome of that experiment, one hypothesis or
the other will be excluded [73]. But the two hypothe-
ses |0〉 and |1〉 have SIC representations p0 and p1, and
〈p0, p1〉 = 1/(d(d+1)). The measurement that defines the
SIC representation, although informationally complete,
does not itself automatically exclude either hypothesis,
because some possible outcomes of it are consistent with
both.
With this motivation, we derive quantum state space
in the following way. We again postulate a Bureau of
Standards measurement, but we assume as little as pos-
sible about the meshing of probability distributions. In-
stead of the urgleichung (26), we merely postulate some
functional relation [75],
q(j) = F ({p(i), r(j|i) : i = 1, . . . , N}) , (C2)
with the property that state vectors with nonzero overlap
are incompatible hypotheses with respect to some mea-
surement. We assume, then, that the inner product of
two state-space vectors is bounded below, and take this
as an aspect of quantum strangeness. Then, we assume
that certainty is bounded. This is less strange, since even
classically, we can imagine a constraint that probability
distributions can never get too focused. These two pos-
tulates tell us that the inner product of two state vectors
lies in the interval [L,U ]. Note that U , being an upper
bound on 〈p, p〉, has an interpretation as an upper bound
on an index of coincidence, which is inversely related to
the effective population size [40, 74, 76]. Imagine an urn
filled with marbles in N different colors. We draw a mar-
ble at random from the urn, note its color, replace it and
draw at random again. If all colors are equally probable,
then the probability of obtaining the same color twice
in succession is 1/N . More generally, if the colors are
weighted by some probability vector p, then the proba-
bility of obtaining the same color twice—i.e., a “coinci-
dence” of colors—is 〈p, p〉. So, we can take the reciprocal
of this quantity as the effective number of colors present.
Regarding the probability vector p as a hypothesis about
a system, the effective population size
Neff(p) =
1
〈p, p〉 (C3)
is the effective number of experiment outcomes that are
compatible with that hypothesis. Given two probability
vectors p and s, we can take
Neff(p, s) = Neff(p)Neff(s) 〈p, s〉 = 〈p, s〉
p2s2
(C4)
as the effective number of outcomes compatible with both
hypotheses p and s.
By following the logic in Section II, we can get an upper
bound on the size of a Mutually Maximally Distant set.
If we postulate that this bound is saturated, we can relate
L, U and N to the effective dimensionality:
d = 1 +
U − 1/N
1/N − L . (C5)
If we take L = 0 in the above expression, which we can
heuristically regard as going to the “classical limit,” then
we end up with d = NU . This says that the total number
of MMD states is the total size of the sample space (N),
divided by the area per state, i.e., the effective population
size 1/U .
Instead of taking L = 0, if we choose—for whatever
reason—that L = U/2 and that N = d2, we get the fa-
miliar upper and lower bounds that define a germ. Pos-
tulating that our state space is maximal then implies
that it is self-polar. Because the state space is contained
within the probability simplex, it contains the polar of
the probability simplex, which is the basis simplex. By
Theorem 23, all the isometries of this set are specified by
the regular simplices whose vertices are valid states lying
on the out-sphere.
Suppose that p and s are two pure states. Then
Neff(p) = Neff(s) =
d(d+ 1)
2
, (C6)
and
Neff(p, s) =
d2(d+ 1)2
4
〈p, s〉 ≥ d(d+ 1)
4
. (C7)
Thus, the fundamental inequalities imply that two hy-
potheses of maximal certainty can only disagree by so
much that their overlap is half the effective number of
outcomes consistent with either hypothesis alone.
We note that Wootters [77], Hardy [36] and others [25]
have used various premises to argue for a relation of the
form N = d2. It bears something of the flavor of a clas-
sical state space whose points are labeled by discretized
position and momentum [62, 78]. (And this resonates
sympathetically with the fact that the Weyl–Heisenberg
group, which is projectively equivalent to Zd×Zd, is the
canonical way to generate SICs [10, 79].) However, at
the moment we find it neither an obvious choice nor a
consequence of a uniquely compelling assumption.
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